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COMMENTS 
Collective Bargaining for Public Employees and the 
Prevention of Strikes in the Public Sector 
In recent years, a number of states have enacted legislation pro-
viding collective bargaining rights for public employees.1 Almost 
invariably these statutes have reaffirmed the traditional prohibition 
against strikes by government workers.2 But the strike-or the 
threat of a strike-has been a key economic weapon for employees 
in the private sector, and some observers contend that without that 
weapon the new collective bargaining rights for public employees 
are illusory.3 · 
Because of the inherent conflict in legislative goals, it is unclear 
at the present time whether the new statutes can achieve both the 
promotion of fairer employment contracts than have prevailed in 
the past and the prevention of all strikes in public employment. 
Furthermore, it is clear that the achievement of both of these goals 
I. Eighteen states now have collective bargaining laws for at least some public 
employees. Many of these statutes are very limited in scope and deal only with 
specific employee groups such as teachers and firemen. Teachers: CAL. EDuc. CODE 
§§ 13080-88 (West 1969); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-153(a), I0-153(e) to (f) (1967), 
§§ 10-153(b) to (d) (Supp. 1969); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 125.19-.26 (Supp. 1969); NEB. 
REv. STAT. §§ 79-1287 to -1296 (1968); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 342.450-.470 (1965); R.I. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 28-9.3-1 to -16 (Supp. 1969); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 28.72.010-.090 
(Supp. 1967). Fire fighters: CAL. LABOR CODE § 1962 (\Vest Supp. 1968); ME. REv. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 980-92 (Supp. 1968); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 217.1-.10 (Supp. 
1969); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 28-9.1-1 to -14 (Supp. 1969); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-265 
to -273 (1967). These limited group statutes vary widely in the extent of rights 
granted. More general coverage is afforded by statutes in other states. Some such 
statutes permit bargaining with any employee group: ALAS. STAT. §§ 23.40.010-.040 
(1962); CAL. GoVT. CODE §§ 3500-11 (West Supp. 1968); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 243.710-.780 
(1967). Other statutes provide for the election of an exclusive bargaining agent, duties 
to bargain, mediation, and unfair labor practice remedies: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 7-467 to -478 (Supp. 1969); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 1301-13 (Supp. 1968); MASS. 
ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 178D (1965), §§ 178F to N (Supp. 1969); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§§ 423.201-.254 (1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 179.50-.58 (1966); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 105.500-
.530 (Supp. 1968); N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 34:13A-1 to -11 (Supp. 1968); N.Y. CIV. SERV. 
LAw §§ 200-12 (McKinney Supp. 1968), as amended, ch. 24, §§ 1-13, [1969] N.Y. Laws 
39 (McKinney Supp. April 10, 1969); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 28-9.4-1 to -19 (1968); 
VT, STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1701-05 (Supp. 1968); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 41.56.010-.900 
(Supp. 1967); WIS. STAT. § 111.70 (municipal employees) (1969); WIS. STAT. §§ 111.80-.94 
(1969). 
2. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 467-78 (Supp. 1969); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.51 
(1966); Mo. REv. STAT. § 105.540 (Supp. 1968); N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 34:13A-l to -11 
(Supp. 1968); N.Y. Crv. $ERV. LAw § 210 (McKinney Supp. 1968), as amended, ch. 24, 
§ 8, [1969] N.Y. Laws 42 (McKinney Supp. April 10, 1969); ORE. REv. STAT. § 243.780 
(1967); WASH. REV. CODE § 41.56.120 (Supp. 1967); Wrs. STAT. § 111.70(4)(2) (1969). 
Only Vermont has recognized a right to strike for situations in which the exercise 
of such right does not endanger the public health, welfare, or safety. VT. STAT, ANN. 
tit. 21, § 1704 (Supp. 1968). 
3. See Kheel, Strikes and Public Employment, 67 MICH, L. REv. 931 (1969). 
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by a "solution" such as simply granting all employee demands is 
unacceptable. Such an approach would ignore the interest of the 
taxpayer who, because he lacks the freedom to buy fewer govern-
ment services if labor costs raise the price of those services, must 
generally bear such increased costs through higher taxes. Thus, any 
proposed solution of the basic policy conflict embodied in public 
sector labor legislation must seek to reconcile the employees' interest 
in more favorable terms and conditions of employment with two 
competing concerns: the prevention of public employee strikes and 
the avoidance of an excessive tax burden. 
I. AN EXAMPLE OF THE DILEMMA 
A. Public Sector Labor Legislation in Michigan 
Union officials have characterized Michigan's statute on labor 
relations in public employment as the "best" of the recent state 
laws.4 Michigan public employees were granted extensive collective 
bargaining rights in the 1965 Public Employee Relations Act 
(PERA),11 which was drafted on the model of the National Labor Re-
lations Act (NLRA).6 It affirms the right of public employees to 
join labor organizations, 7 specifies election proceedings for the de-
termination of an exclusive bargaining representative for an appro-
priate unit,8 requires the governmental employer to bargain in good 
faith,9 prohibits interference or discrimination by the employer,10 
and provides the employee with remedies for employer unfair labor 
practices.11 But the Michigan PERA departed from the NLRA 
model by retaining the strike prohibition that had existed prior 
to its enactment.12 The 1965 legislation did, however, repeal several 
sections which had been tied to the strike prohibition and which 
had provided specific penalties to be imposed upon those who par-
ticipated in a public employee strike.13 
Following adoption of the PERA, many local governmental 
units in Michigan were for the first time confronted by their em-
4. Government Employee Relations Report [hereinafter GERR] No. 282, at AA-5 
(Feb. 3, 1969). 
5. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 423.201-.254 (1967). 
6. 29 u.s.c. §§ 151-68 (1964). 
7. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 423.209 (1967). 
8. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 423.211-.212 (1967). 
9. MICH. COMP, LAWS ANN. § 423.215 (1967). 
IO. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 423.210 (1967). 
11. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 423.216 (1967) provides remedies for violations by the 
employer of prohibitions enumerated in § 423.210. 
12. MICH. COMP, LAWS ANN, § 423.201 (1967). 
13. The 1965 amendment repealed Law of July 3, 1947, no. 336, § 4, [1947] Mich. 
Acts 633, providing for automatic termination of employment for violation of the 
act, and § 8 providing criminal penalties for any nonemployee inciting a strike. 
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ployees with a demand to bargain. Since many inexperienced parties 
were entering the collective bargaining arena, it was perhaps in-
evitable that difficult disputes would arise.14 
B. The Holland School Dispute 
In Holland, Michigan, the Board of Education began negotia-
tions with the Holland Education Association-the teachers' rep-
resentative-in March 1967. The teachers' contracts expired in June 
of that year, but bargaining continued beyond that time. During 
the negotiations, the Association requested mediation, and later, 
fact-finding.15 On August 18, 1967, although no contract agreement 
had been reached, the Board of Education unilaterally notified the 
teachers' representative that September 5 had been set for the open-
ing of school. On September 2, 1967, pursuant to the PERA, the 
teachers filed an unfair labor practice charge alleging that the Board 
had refused to bargain in good faith.16 The parties failed to reach 
agreement on a contract at a negotiating session on September 4, 
and the Holland teachers voted to "withhold their services," until 
a contract had been signed. Accordingly, they did not report for 
work the next day. 
14. When public employee bargaining first goes into effect, negotiating problems 
are quite likely to arise. Many administrators tend to be uncertain of the scope of 
their authority to make agreements concerning expenditures of yet uncommitted 
public funds. For discussion, see Anderson, Public Collective Bargaining and Social 
Change, GERR No. 257, at E-1, E-2 (Aug. 12, 1968); Rehmus, Constraints on Local 
Governments in Public Employee Bargaining, 67 MICH. L. REv. 919 (1969). Moreover, 
newly formed local bargaining units, after achieving representative status with a bare 
majority, are eager to produce benefits for the employees in order to avoid being 
supplanted by a more militant union. Hence, they tend to press for large raises in 
salary. See generally Hildebrand, The Public Sector, in FRONTIERS OF COLLECTIVE BAR-
GAINING 125 (1967) [hereinafter Hildebrand]. But this tendency to seek large pay 
increases has not, at least in Michigan, resulted in the enrichment of public school 
teachers to the detriment of other needs in the area of public education. Indeed, the 
percentage of education funds spent on teachers' salaries has remained nearly constant. 
GERR No. 256, at B-1 (Aug. 5, 1968). 
15. Michigan's Public Employee Relations Act [hereinafter PERA] specifically pro• 
vides for mediation of public employee disputes by the State Labor Mediation Board. 
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 423.207 (1967). The fact-finding function is derived from 
the general mediation provisions. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 423.25 (1967). 
16. The Michigan statute is silent as to whether a school board has exclusive power 
to set the opening of school. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 340.575 (1967) allows 
the school board to determine the length of the school year. But § 15 of the Michigan 
PERA, MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 423.215 (1967), requires the employer to negotiate 
wages, hours, and conditions of employment. The Holland Education Association 
argued, apparently unsuccessfully, that the opening of school was a "condition 
of employment" negotiable under the statute, and that since the opening date 
had in fact been a subject of the negotiations, the school district could not prop-
erly set the calendar until agreement on that point had been reached. Brief for 
Defendant at IO, School Dist. v. Holland Educ. Assn., 7 Mich. App. 569 (1967). In 
rejecting the argument, the decision of the court was consistent with analogous law 
under the National Labor Relations Act which permits employers to institute uni-
lateral changes after impasse has been reached. See NLRB v. U.S. Sonics Corp., 312 
F.2d 610 (1st Cir. 1963). 
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On September 6, the Board of Education petitioned the Circuit 
Court for Ottawa County for a preliminary injunction ordering the 
teachers to refrain from the strike action. The injunction was 
granted the same day.17 The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed 
the issuance of the injunction.18 
The Holland Education Association took the case to the Supreme 
Court of Michigan.19 The teachers argued that since they had not 
signed contracts after the expiration of their old agreements in June 
1967, they were not "public employees."20 They reasoned that there-
fore their action could not be considered a strike and thus prohibited 
by the PERA.21 They further contended that "discipline" of em-
ployees was the exclusive remedy open to employers under the new 
statute,22 and that injunctive relief was thereby precluded. In any 
event, they argued, the employer should be denied use of the in-
junctive remedy because he had refused to bargain in good faith.23 
Finally, the teachers contended that an injunction was proper only 
when a court had found that a particular strike would cause ir-
reparable harm to the public.24 The Michigan Supreme Court ac-
cepted the last two of these arguments, dissolved the injunction, 
and remanded the case for consideration of whether irreparable 
harm to the public would result if the strike were not enjoined.25 
The Holland decision raises many of the fundamental questions 
which are present whenever a statute grants collective bargaining 
rights to public employees without lifting the traditional ban on 
strikes. This Comment will examine several of those problems, and 
will then consider what approach to public sector labor relations 
might best reconcile the conflicting goals which are exhibited. in 
statutes such as Michigan's PERA. 
II. Sol\m PROBLEMS INHERENT IN THE STRIKE BAN 
A. "Strikes" Are Prohibited-What Is a "Strike"? 
In Holland, the teachers argued that they were not on "strike" 
within the meaning of the Michigan statute. They contended that 
17. School Dist. v. Holland Educ. Assn., No. 1238 (Mich. Cir. Ct. for Ottawa 
County Sept. 6, 1967). The temporary injunction was phrased as an order to refrain 
from unlawful activity-striking-rather than as a mandatory order to return to work. 
18. School Dist. v. Holland Educ. Assn., 7 Mich. App. 569 (1967). 
19. School Dist. v. Holland Educ. Assn., 380 Mich. 314, 157 N.W.2d 206 (1968). 
20. 380 Mich. at 322, 157 N.W .2d at 208. 
21. 380 Mich. at 322, 157 N.W.2d at 208. 
22. 380 Mich. at 324, 157 N.W.2d 209; see MrcH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 432.206 (1967). 
23. 380 Mich. at 327, 157 N.W.2d at 211. 
24. 380 Mich. at 326, 157 N.W.2d at 210. 
25. 380 Mich. at 327, 157 N.W.2d at 211. 
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since they had not yet signed contracts with the school district, 
they could not be "employees" subject to the PERA.26 Although 
two of the justices favoring reversal accepted that contention,27 the 
remainder of the majority found a continuing employment relation-
ship which was substantial enough that absence from work consti-
tuted an illegal strike under the comprehensive definition contained 
in the Michigan statute.28 In this respect, Holland is analogous to 
National Labor Relations Board decisions holding that even though 
a particular collective bargaining contract has expired, the parties 
to that contract_ remain subject to the provisions of the NLRA. 
The emphasis in those cases is on the continuation of the employ-
ment relationships, not merely on the existence of a contract.29 The 
Holland majority supported its interpretation by reference to its 
earlier decision in Garden City School District v. Labor Mediation 
Board.30 In that case, the court held that school teachers who were 
between contract periods were "employees" and thus qualified un-
der state law to utilize the statutory mediation procedures available 
to public employees.31 A holding in Holland that the teachers were 
not "employees" with respect to the no-strike provisions of the 
PERA would have presented at least an apparent inconsistency. 
Hence, the court rejected the teachers' argument.32 
In Holland there was a concerted refusal to work; consequently, 
26. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 340.569 (1967). 
27. These were Justices Souris and Kavanagh. 380 Mich. at 327, 157 N.W.2d at 2II 
(concurring opinion). 
28. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 423.201 (1967) defines "strike" as "the failure to 
report for duty, the wilful absence from one's position, the stoppage of work, or the 
abstinence in whole or in part from the full, faithful and proper performance of the 
duties of employment, for the purpose of inducing, influencing or coercing a change 
in the conditions, or compensation, or the rights, privileges or obligations of employ• 
ment." 
29. See, e.g., NLRB v. MacKay Radio&: Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938). 
30. 358 Mich. 258, 99 N.W2d 485 (1959). 
31. 358 Mich. at 262, 99 N.W.2d at 487. Those procedures are provided by MICH. 
COMP, LAWS ANN. §§ 423.207, 423.25 (1967). 
32. 380 Mich. at 323, 99 N.W.2d at 209. This interpretation is supported by stat-
utory provisions granting teachers tenure protection [MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 38.91 
(1967)] and by provisions requiring teachers to give sixty days notice of termination of 
employment in order to retain tenure benefits (§ 38.III). 
Yet the opposite conclusion would not necessarily be "inconsistent" with the over-
all intent of the act. The decision in Garden City School Dist. v. Labor Mediation 
Bd., 358 Mich. 258, 99 N,W.2d 485 {1959), was inescapable if the statutory mediation 
services were to be of any use at all; if they were not available until a contract had 
been signed, there would presumably never be any need for them. Hence the Garden 
City decision might be viewed as necessary to extend to future employees the protec-
tion of the Michigan labor mediation statute. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 423.25 (1967). 
Such an interpretation would be consistent with the analogous provision of NLRA 
§ 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a){3) (1964), which provides protection from antiunion ac-
tivity to certain nonemployees. See MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 423.2IO(c) (1967) for the 
parallel provision of Michigan's PERA, forbidding employer discrimination with 
respect to hiring or settling terms and conditions of employment. 
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once the employment relationship had been established, the court did 
not have to interpret the facts liberally in order to hold that the re-
fusal was a "strike." But in other cases, employee activities short of 
refusals to work under an unexpired contract have been broadly con-
strued as strikes. For example, National Education Association 
"sanctions" have been held to constitute a strike,33 as have fire 
fighters' "partial staffing" campaigns.34 Greater definitional prob-
lems arise, however, when the alleged strike consists of "working 
by the rules" or, in the case of policemen, strict enforcement of the 
law.35 
This readiness on the part of the courts to find that a strike exists 
can be supported on the ground that it effectuates the legislative 
purpose in continuing the strike ban. But the technical arguments 
advanced in Holland and the resort to quasi-strike tactics highlight 
the frustration of public employees who are dissatisfied with the 
terms and conditions of their employment but who are prohibited 
from striking. Such manifestations of frustration suggest that pro-
viding a precise definition of a "strike" will not be the best way 
to stabilize labor relations in the public sector. Rather, it will be 
far more profitable to concentrate on procedures that will make 
the collective bargaining process more effective in avoiding disrup-
tion and in producing results which will be viewed as legitimate by 
employees, employers, and the public. 
B. Limitations on Judicial Enforcement of a Statutory 
Strike Ban 
Assuming that the employees' conduct in a particular situation 
is held to constitute a strike for purposes of the statute, the question 
then arising is what remedial measures a court should provide. Al-
though the issuance of an injunction immediately upon finding that 
a strike has occurred is consistent with the legislative intent man-
ifested in the strike ban, inflexible adherence to such a pattern may 
only aggravate already strained labor relations. Moreover, while 
that consideration is substantial in itself, there are, in addition, 
limitations on the power of courts to issue injunctions against 
33. Board of Educ. of Union Beach v. New Jersey Educ. Assn., 53 N.J. 29, 247 A.2d 
867 (1968) (blacklisting of school district by National Education Association). See also 
Board of Educ. v. Shanker, 54 Misc. 2d 941, 283 N.Y.S.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1967) (pur-
ported mass resignation). 
34. GERR No. 271, at B-9 (Nov. 18, 1968). "Partial staffing" is a refusal by the 
fire fighters to engage in routine or administrative work. 
35. See Kheel, Strikes and Public Employment, 67 MICH. L. REV. 931, 935 (1969). 
For a general discussion of the use of "strike substitutes" as negotiating weapons in 
the public sector, see Wortman, Collective Bargaining Tactics in the Federal Civil 
Service, 15 LAD. L.J. 482, 489 (1964). Another example of such tactics was shown re-
cently in the "sick-out" by airport traffic controllers, which resulted in a traffic slow-
down and delays. GERR No. 302, at A-9 (June 23, 1969). 
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striking public employees. Even if an injunction is constitu-
tionally permissible, 86 it may be as difficult to enforce as would be 
a positive order to work-an order that courts of equity are tradi-
tionally loathe to issue.87 How can a court ensure that a group of 
professional teachers is performing adequately rather than contin-
uing to engage in illegal concerted activity through failure to fulfill 
their duties? Furthermore, in situations involving skilled public 
employees, the public may be harmed more by slipshod perfor-
mance than by a temporary suspension of services. Indeed, a delay 
in the opening of school may be more desirable than an extended 
period during which "teaching" occurs under judicial coercion. 
The most serious practical effect of a stringent injunction policy 
is that it can breed distrust of the legal process. When labor rela-
tions have deteriorated to a point at which employees will violate 
the antistrike law, those employees may also be prepared to take 
the final step of disregarding a court order. If they do so, the limits 
of judicial enforcement have been reached, and the underlying 
respect crucial to the judicial process is gone. A court faced with 
a wholesale refusal to obey its order has no recourse but to use con-
tempt citations. Subsequent fining or incarceration of violators may 
serve only to reinforce public employees' beliefs that any law which 
denies them rights enjoyed by other workers is fundamentally un-
fair.38 
36. It is sometimes argued that use of the injunction in public employee labor 
disputes both violates the constitutional prohibition against involuntary servitude and 
abridges freedom of speech. The involuntary servitude argument stems from the fact 
that the injunctions have the effect of ordering persons to work, even though they are 
phrased in a nonmandatory fashion, that is, as an order to cease illegal activity-
strikes. The argument is typically countered by the observation that the employees 
remain free to resign at any time. In re Block, 50 N.J. 494, 236 A.2d 589 (1967). 
Under an injunction of "illegal concerted activity," however, the employees are not 
free to resign in concert, and such an injunction may be worded broadly enough to 
make any resignation suspect. See Board of Educ. of Union Beach v. New Jersey 
Educ. Assn., 53 N.J. 29, 247 A.2d 867 (1968) (submission of resignations by teachers 
as part of sanctions held concerted action to illegal end and enjoined). See also Board 
of Educ. v. Shanker, 54 Misc. 2d 941, 283 N.Y.S.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1967) (purported mass 
resignation held to be an illegal strike). 
The argument that an injunction in the public sector abridges freedom of speech 
is countered by the "illegal ends" doctrine-that when the exercise of speech is inci-
dent to a course of illegal activity, its suppression is valid. See, e.g., City of Pawtucket 
v. Pawtucket Teachers Alliance, Local 930, 87 R.I. 364, 141 A.2d 624 (1958), in which 
the court held that there was no violation of freedom of speech when a union leader 
was held in contempt of an antistrike injunction for giving a public speech calling for a 
strike. But cf. In re Colin Scott Berry, 68 Cal. App. 2d 137, 436 P.2d 273, 65 Cal. Rptr. 
273 (1968), in which the court held that an order enjoining all strike activities includ• 
ing informational picketing was unconstitutionally broad. 
37. See, e.g., Arthur v. Oakes, 63 F. 310 (7th Cir. 1894); Wakeham v. Barker, 82 
Cal. 46, 22 P. 1131 (1889). 
38. For discussion of New York City's painful experience in this regard see Khecl, 
Report to Speaker Anthony J. Travia on the Taylor Law, with a Proposed Plan to 
Prevent Strikes by Public Workers (Feb. 21, 1968) [hereinafter Kheel Report]; Kheel, 
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These problems confronted the Michigan Supreme Court in 
the Holland case. The strike, on its face, was illegal; that illegality 
was the sole basis upon which the lower court had issued the in-
junction. The supreme court, however, refused to allow the injunc-
tion merely upon proof of a strike ban violation. Instead, it 
accepted the teachers' argument that the injunction could not issue 
unless the traditional prerequisites for equitable relief were estab-
lished.39 Thus, an employer-plaintiff seeking an injunction against 
striking public workers in Michigan must now enter court with 
"clean hands," that is, the employer must first have bargained in 
good faith.40 In addition, the employer must show that irreparable 
harm to the public will result from the strike.41 In effect, the Hol-
land court applied the same standards for enjoining strikes by pub-
lic school teachers that it has applied to strikes by employees in 
the private sector.42 While that approach appears reasonable, it 
requires further analysis. 
First, private sector precedent restricting the use of injunctions 
in labor disputes is inapposite to the public sector in which strikes 
are not otherwise legal.43 A strike by public employees is a direct 
violation of a statute, even when there is no violence or irreparable 
injury to the public. Therefore, by applying the irreparable-harm 
Points for Consideration by the Governor's Conference on Public Employment Rela-
tions, GERR No. 267, at H-1 (Oct. 24-, 1968); Montana, Striking Teachers, Welfare, 
Transit, and Sanitation Workers, 19 LAB. L.J. 273 (1968). 
!19. Many courts, however, have rejected this argument in the case of an illegal 
strike by public employees. The Supreme Court of New Jersey, for example, in an 
action to enjoin teachers' sanctions against a school district, recently held that absence 
of present injury from the threatened sanctions and the lack of "clean hands" by the 
employer would not prevent ac- injunction from issuing. Board of Educ. of Union 
Beach v. New Jersey Educ. Assn., 53 N.J. 29, 43, 247 A.2d 867, 875 {1968). That de-
cision was reached under a collective bargaining statute similar to that in force in 
Michigan. N.J. REv. STAT. §§ 34-13a-1 to -11 (Supp. 1968). On the other hand, under a 
present New York statute-N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAw § 211 (McKinney Supp. 1968)-a pub-
lic employer is unconditionally obligated to seek an injunction of an illegal strike, 
and the court is required under N.Y. JUDICIARY LAw § 751(2) (McKinney 1968) to 
grant it. But in this connection, the Michigan court in the Holland decision indi-
cated that a legislative attempt to compel a court of equity to issue an injunction in 
every instance of a public employee strike would be "to destroy the independence 
of the judicial branch of government." 380 Mich. 314, 325, 157 N.W.2d 206, 210 
(1968). 
40. 380 Mich. at 327, 157 N.W.2d at 211. 
41. 380 Mich. at 326, 57 N.W.2d at 210. 
42. Unlike some states, Michigan has no "little Norris-LaGuardia Act" restricting 
the use of injunctions in labor disputes. But Michigan courts have in the past de-
veloped a public policy against issuing injunctions absent a showing of violence or 
irreparable harm. See School Dist. v. Holland Educ. Assn., 380 Mich. 314, 326, 157 
N.W.2d 206, 210 (1968); Cross Co. v. Local 155, UAW, 371 Mich. 184, 123 N."W.2d 215 
(1963). 
43. In fact, federal labor policy, as embodied in the NLRA and the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, considers the right to strike as fundamental to private sector em-
ployees. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15, 163 (1964). 
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standard of the private sector to public sector strikes, the court ap-
pears to have disregarded the legislative intent expressed in the anti-
strike statute. That disregard suggests that the decision was prompted 
by other factors not specifically mentioned in the opinion. For exam-
ple, a resolution which favored the issuing of an injunction on the 
mere showing of a strike could present the severe enforcement 
problems already discussed,44 and, more seriously, could erode the 
employees' confidence in the legal system.45 Still more important is 
the possibility that a decision which made injunctive relief uni-
versally available against public employee strikes would render il-
lusory the collective bargaining rights granted under the PERA, 
because the employer could then invariably depend upon the in-
junction to enforce his bargaining position, regardless of whether 
he had bargained in good faith. Accordingly, although the Holland 
court relied on a questionable analogy to private sector strikes, its 
decision can be supported on the ground that it comes closest to 
effecting judicially what must be the central legislative intent of 
the Michigan PERA-to provide an effective bargaining system. In-
deed, by rendering uncertain the availability of injunctive relief, 
the court probably promoted prestrike settlements. Since neither 
the employer nor the union can depend upon the injunction or 
the strike to enforce its demands, each party is encouraged to use 
the bargaining process in order to reach a settlement. 
It is apparent that much of the benefit stemming from the un-
certainty created by the Holland decision will be only temporary. 
As subsequent case law develops standards concerning the condi-
tions under which an injunction will issue in public employee 
strikes, parties will incorporate those standards into their respective 
bargaining positions. Hence the bargaining will not differ substan-
tially from the pre-Holland situation. Moreover, in cases in which, 
according to the standards developed, an injunction will not be 
issued, those employees will then have, in effect, the right to strike.46 
While such a result may or may not prove to be a public evil, it is 
clear that the result is not consistent with the intent of no-strike 
legislation. 47 
44. See notes 36-37 supra and accompanying text. 
45. See note 38 supra and accompanying text. 
46. The Holland decision has apparently been interpreted by local courts as ef-
fectively removing the injunction from many public employee labor disputes. Board 
of Educ. v. Chippewa Valley Educ. Assn., No. S68-4660 (Mich. Cir. Ct. for Macomb 
County, filed Oct. 28, 1968), reprinted in GERR No. 272, at B-5 (Nov. 25, 1968). 
Moreover, Holland would not affect the right employers have under l\lICH, COMP, 
LAws ANN. § 423.206 (1967) to discipline striking employees subsequent to the strike. 
But that power is ordinarily of little practical value, since a public employer con-
fronted with labor strife is generally reluctant to disturb a freshly achieved settlement 
by disciplining the individuals involved. 
47. See Taylor, Impasse Procedure-The Finality Question, Remarks at New York 
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In the final analysis, then, the Holland decision seems, at best, a 
temporary expedient necessitated by a judicial perception of the 
inherently conflicting aims of strike prevention through legislative 
prohibition on the one hand and collective bargaining on the other. 
If the conflict is ever to be adequately resolved, it is incumbent 
upon the legislature to devise more appropriate means by which 
the dual goals of meaningful bargaining and strike prevention may 
be achieved. 
III. APPROACHES TO RESOLVING THE CONFLICT 
As is indicated by the foregoing discussion of the Holland de-
cision, even the more "progressive" of the new public employee 
statutes have failed to resolve the problems of labor relations in the 
public sector. At least, however, the statutes have served to illustrate 
the nature and extent of the conflict which exists in the area. The 
following discussion will consider four possible remedial approaches 
which have traditionally been used or which could be used for re-
solving the conflict: the punitive approach, recognition of a limited 
right to strike, the aid to bargaining approach, and the unfair labor 
practice proceeding. 
A. The Punitive Approach 
The punitive approach is based on the theory that the imposi-
tion of penalties for striking will deter future strikes. The pattern 
for punitive statutes was set by New York's Condon-Wadlin La·w48 
which provided for the automatic dismissal of striking employees, 
with the provision that any striker subsequently rehired could not 
receive higher pay for three years following the strike, and would 
remain on probation for five years.49 Punitive provisions of this sort 
have not been very effective in preventing public employee strikes, 
for several reasons. First, when enforcement is at the discretion of 
the employer, sanctions are rarely invoked, because employees dis-
missed on account of strike activity may be hard to replace. More-
over, when union organization is strong, a public employer is not 
likely to dismiss striking employees, because such measures would 
probably only exacerbate an already delicate situation. Mandatory 
sanctions have been only slightly more successful, because the same 
Governor's Conference on Public Employee Relations, in GERR No. 267, at G-1 
(Oct. 10, 1968). 
48. Law of March 27, 1947, ch. 391, [1947] N.Y. Laws 842, as amended, Law of 
April 23, 1963, ch. 702, [1963] N.Y. Laws 2432 (repealed 1967). 
49. Law of March 27, 1947, ch. 391, § I, [1947] N.Y. Laws 842, as amended, Law of 
April 23, 1963, ch. 702, § I [1963] N.Y. Laws 2432 (repealed 1967). The antistrike 
provision of the Minnesota collective bargaining law is substantially similar to the 
Condon-Wadlin Law in that respect. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.55 (1966). 
270 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 68:260 
considerations which prevent management from invoking discre-
tionary sanctions also encourage it to evade required sanctions 
whenever possible. 50 
Since statutory sanctions against striking employees have proved 
largely unsuccessful in preventing strikes, 51 such provisions have 
generally been omitted from the newer public employment rela-
tions acts. The Michigan PERA, for example, removed all the stat-
utory sanctions except the employer's discretionary right to dismiss 
a striking employee, and the impact of that remaining sanction is 
diminished by the statute's provision of procedural safeguards for 
the employee.52 When New York's Taylor Law53 was enacted, pro-
visions for sanctions against individual employees were removed 
in favor of sanctions directed against the union organization itself.fi4 
Another aspect of the traditional punitive approach which con-
tributes to its ineffectiveness in producing stable labor relations 
relates to its after-the-fact nature. Sanctions are not applied until 
the labor relations have degenerated into a strike situation, and 
when punitive measures are introduced at that late stage, the effect 
may be to make the employees more militant and less amenable to 
rational settlement. 55 
Even more fundamentally, it may be suggested that the tradi-
tional punitive approach is inherently productive of instability in 
labor relations. When its impact is not offset by any grant of bar-
50. Thus, when New York City vehicle drivers went on strike in 1962, the em-
ployees "dismissed" under the Condon-Wadlin Law were simply shifted to re-employ-
ment in other city departments following the strike. Montana, supra note 38, at 274. 
51. From 1947 to 1959, for example, there occurred over 450 strikes by public em• 
ployees. See Note, Labor Relations in the Public Service, 75 HARV. L. REv. 391, 407 
(1961). 
52. MICH. COMP. LAws .ANN. § 423.206 (1967). It was removal of the statutory sanc-
tions from the Michigan law which prompted the Holland teachers to argue that the 
substituted provision for employer "discipline" was intended to be an exclusive 
remedy and that therefore the court was precluded from issuing an injunction. School 
Dist. v. Holland Educ. Assn., 380 Mich. 314, 324, 157 N.W.2d 206, 209 (1968). The 
court, however, rejected that argument, and construed the statute as not affecting the 
"historic power of courts to enjoin strikes by public employees." 380 Mich. at 325, 157 
N.W.2d at 210, citing Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d ll42 (1953). 
53. N.Y. CIV. SERv. LAw §§ 200-12 (McKinney Supp. 1968), as amended, ch. 24, 
§§ 1-13, [1969] N.Y. Laws 39 (McKinney Supp. April 10, 1969). The Taylor Law re-
placed the Condon-Wadlin Law. 
54. Under the Taylor Law, penalties for violating the strike prohibition included 
fines against the union, loss of dues check-off privileges, and, ultimately, withdrawal 
of recognition. However, in March 1969, the Taylor Law was amended to reinstate 
penalties against individual employees. Ch. 24, § 8 [1969] N.Y. Laws 42-43 (McKinney 
Supp. April 10, 1969), amending N.Y. Crv. SERV. LAw § 210(2) (McKinney Supp. 1968). 
For each strike day, the individual employee must have the equivalent of two days 
pay deducted from his paycheck. The provision for strike penalties has been recently 
criticized by George W. Taylor, who recommends repeal of those provisions. GERR 
No. 317, at B-9 (Oct. 6, 1969). 
55. See note 38 supra and accompanying text. 
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gaining rights-as has been the case until recent years-the punitive 
approach produces a severe imbalance of bargaining power. Em-
ployees are faced with the choices of taking whatever the employer 
offers, quitting, or striking and facing the penalties. Under such 
circumstances, it may reasonably appear to the employees that they 
have little to lose by striking. A stringently punitive approach may 
be functional as long as employees are unorganized and jobs are 
scarce. But as the relative affiuence and strength of employee organ-
izations increase, the obvious inequity of the purely punitive ap-
proach may encourage public employee strikes rather than prevent 
them. 
B. The Limited Right To Strike 
One of the main difficulties in public employee collective bar-
gaining stems from the prohibition of strikes. If that prohibition 
did not exist, it might be assumed that bargaining would proceed 
much as it does in the private sector with both parties negotiating 
in a mutual effort to avoid work stoppage. Negotiations would be 
more effective and would arguably result in fewer strikes. Some 
observers have therefore advocated the recognition of a limited 
right to strike. That approach has been recommended by the 
Pennsylvania Governor's Advisory Commission,56 the New York 
K.heel Report, 57 the Maryland Governor's Report, 58 and various 
labor groups.59 It would grant the right to strike to all public em-
ployees except those engaged in areas crucial to the public safety, 
such as police and fire fighters, for whom impasses could be resolved 
by compulsory arbitration.60 
While the concept of the limited right to strike has an un-
deniable appeal, it does not appear to offer the best solution to the 
56. Governor's Commission To Revise the Public Employee Law of Pennsylvania, 
Report and Recommendations, June 1968, reprinted in GERR No. 251, at E-1 (July I, 
1968) [hereinafter Pennsylvania Report]. 
57. Kheel Report, supra note 38. Kheel recommends that if a strike situation 
should develop, and if the public services involved are critical, there might be a 
provision for a Taft-Hartley style "cooling-off" injunction. Kheel Report, supra note 
38, at 32. 
58. Governor's Task Force on Public Employee Labor Relations, Report and 
Recommendations, Dec. 23, 1968, reprinted in GERR No. 278, at AA-3 (Jan. 6, 1969) 
[hereinafter Maryland Report]. This report of Governor Agnew's task force is particu-
larly illustrative of the sharp differences of opinion over the strike question. Five of 
the seventeen members dissented from the committee recommendations-an unusual 
occurrence since such committees are notorious for their unanimity. See generally 
Lehman, Crime, the Public, and the Crime Commission: A Critical Review of the 
Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, 66 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1487, 1499-509 (1968). 
59. See, e.g., Address by Jerry Wurf, President of the American Federation of 
State, County, and Municipal Employees [hereinafter AFSCME], GERR No. 266, at 
F-3 (Oct. 14, 1968). 
60. See Pennsylvania Report, supra note 56, at E-1. 
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problems of public employment.61 Moreover, advocacy of a limited 
right to strike is likely to be a mere academic exercise because im-
plementation of that approach will probably remain politically 
impossible. It has been said that the "public will tolerate the fact 
of strike in public employment to the point of extremis; but will 
not accept the principle of the right to strike."62 The political ob-
stacle to recognizing that right was recently demonstrated in Penn-
sylvania when the governor, in submitting the Commission's 
recommendations to the legislature, omitted the provisions which 
favored the limited right to strike. 63 
It might be argued that, as a practical matter, explicit recognition 
of the right to strike is not necessary for that right to exist as an 
element in collective bargaining. Since the strike prohibition means 
little without enforcement machinery, a legislature can give tacit 
recognition to the strike power simply by removing punitive sanc-
tions. To some extent, that is now the case in Michigan, where the 
statutory sanctions have been removed64 and the availability of 
injunctive relief has been limited by Holland to situations in-
volving violence or irreparable harm.65 
Tacit recognition of the right to strike when the statutory prohi-
bition remains has been criticized as fostering disrespect for law; 00 
but tacit recognition might be a lesser evil than the present public 
61. Some have denounced the idea of a limited right to strike as illusory in that 
it would apply to relatively few employees. For instance, according to an Address by 
George W. Taylor at the New York Governor•s Conference [GERR No. 267, at G·l, 
G-4 (Oct. 21, 1968)], only 1.3 million of 6.4 million local government employees arc 
engaged in activities that are clearly nonessential. 
62. Speech by Arvid Anderson, GERR No. 257, at E·l, E-3 (Aug. 12, 1968), quoting 
Saul Wallen, arbitrator on the New York Board of Collective Bargaining. 
63. GERR No. 267, at B-1 (Oct. 21, 1968). A similar example occurred in New 
Jersey when Democratic Governor Hughes vetoed the Republican legislature's public 
employment bill on the ground that it was not explicit enough in outlawing the 
public employee strike. However, the legislature enacted the bill over the veto, and 
in a subsequent court test, the original wording proved to be adequate to maintain 
the strike prohibition. Board of Educ. of Union Beach v. New Jersey Educ. Assn., 53 
N.J. 29, 47, 247 A.2d 867, 877 (1968). 
64. The 1965 Act repealed sections providing criminal penalties (Law of July 3, 
1947, no. 336, § 8, [1947] Mich. Acts 633), loss of employment and retirement rights 
(§ 4), and restrictions on re-employment (§ 5). The employer is left with a rather 
obscure power to discipline strikers [MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.206 (1967)]. But 
the severity of that power is tempered by the inclusion of procedural safeguards in 
the disciplinary process (§ 423.206), and by the fact tliat as a practical matter em-
ployers are not likely to invoke sanctions which can be applied only after employees 
have returned to work. After tlie employees have returned, tlie employer is likely to be 
more interested in preserving newly cemented relations tlian in punishing strikers 
and tliereby risking furtlier strife. 
65. 380 Mich. 314, 326, 157 N.W.2d 206, 210 (1968). See note 42 supra. 
66. See Address by George W. Taylor, supra note 61, at G-3. Indeed, such a back-
door approach to tlie strike question may appear particularly ill-advised at a time 
of public concern for law and order-a concern prompted in part perhaps by tlie 
apparent tendency of many to disregard laws tliat tliey consider personally distasteful. 
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employee laws which may seem to workers to be so grossly unfair 
that respect for "law" deteriorates to the point that the leaders will 
defy even an injunction. Indeed, subsequent incarceration of strike 
leaders raises them to martyr status, and the resulting mass move-
ment psychology unifies employees even more strongly against the 
law.67 In view of that consideration, tacit recognition may well re-
sult in more respect for the law than would otherwise be the case. 
Even if some form of recognition of the right to strike is feasible, 
it may still be questioned whether granting that right will provide 
an adequate solution to the problems of public sector labor rela-
tions. The arguments in favor of recognition of the right to strike 
rest upon the analogy to the private sector. It is thought that since 
the strike in the private sector serves to equalize bargaining power 
and to encourage serious negotiations, the strike power would pro-
duce similar benefits in the public employment situation.68 How-
ever, in view of the unique characteristics of public employment, 
the validity of an analogy to the private sector may be seriously 
doubted. 
The fundamental factor ignored by proponents of recognition 
is that while the strike may be necessary to give private employees 
bargaining power sufficient to offset their employer's power, public 
employees may already possess bargaining leverage not available to 
those in the private area. The added leverage stems from the essen-
tially political nature of public employment. The employer is 
charged with the political responsibility of regulating public ser-
vices: the transit must be kept running; the garbage removed; and 
the schools kept open. Any prolonged cessation of such important 
services is likely to reflect adversely upon public servants in po-
litically sensitive positions. Hence, there may be strong pressure 
on the employer to settle quickly except when union demands are 
highly excessive. In addition, public employee unions may have a 
degree of leverage stemming from direct political control. Indeed, 
the traditional, and only, methods by which public employees have 
exerted their influence have been lobbying and political redress 
at the polls.69 Although those methods tend to be inadequate by 
themselves, they can be formidable when used in conjunction with 
a strong organization.70 In light of the increasing significance of 
67. See Address by Jerry Wurf, supra note 59. 
68. See, e.g., Note, The Strike and Its Alternatives in Public Employment, 1966 
Wis. L. R.Ev. 549, 557; Kheel Report, supra note 38, at 15. 
69. See, e.g., Smith &: McLaughlin, Public Employment: A Neglected Area of Re• 
search and Training in Labor Relations, 16 INous. &: LAB. REL. R.Ev. 30, 37 (1962). 
See also Kheel, Strikes and Public Employment, 67 MrcH. L. R.Ev. 931, 932 (1969). 
70. Lobbying by organized public employees has been used most effectively by 
postal unions. In 1960, for example, after President Eisenhower had vetoed a bill to 
raise the pay of federal employees and had criticized the "unconcealed political pres-
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public employment, both in terms of actual numbers of employees 
and in terms of percentage of the total work force, 71 political pres-
sure shows little indication of diminishing in effectiveness.72 A pos-
sible further strengthening of the traditional political approach is 
suggested by the erosion of restrictions on the political activities of 
public employees.73 As a consequence of those collateral powers, 
public employee unions may possess the balance of political power, 
and, in effect, have the power to fire their employers for failure to 
meet union demands. Indeed, in the extreme case, it may be possi-
ble even to replace the public official with a union representative. 74 
sures exerted ••• on Congress by . . . employees," Congress overrode the veto, an 
action accomplished only one other time in the Eisenhower administration. W. HART, 
COLI.ECTJ.VE BARGAINING IN THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE 26 (1961). 
71. Between 1930 and 1960 the percentage of public employees in the civilian 
labor force increased from 6% to 12%. Smith &: McLaughlin, supra note 69, at 31. 
Moreover, state and local governments alone are responsible for one out of every two 
nonfarm jobs created, with a rate of increase three times that in private employment. 
U.S. OFFICE OF MANPOWER, AUTOMATION &: TRAINING, DEPT. OF LABOR MANPOWER, 
EMPLOYMENT TRENDS AND MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS IN GOVERNMENT 1, 11 (No. 9, 
1963). See generally Donoian, The AFGE and the AFSCME: Labor's Hope for the 
Future?, 18 LAB. L.J. 727 (1967). 
72. That a public employee union's political skills remain an important consider-
ation was illustrated by the recent employee representation election campaign in the 
Internal Revenue Service. In that campaign, the ability of the contending unions to 
influence Congress was a central issue. GERR No. 274, at A-1 (Dec. 9, 1968). The 
power of political persuasion is also evidenced by organized labor's opposition to any 
reorganization of the Post Office which would diminish congressional control over 
wages. See Statement by George Meany to House Post Office and Civil Service Com-
mittee, GERR No. 308, at A-4, F-1 (Aug. 4, 1969). In light of the continuing existence 
of state legislative restraints on local governments' taxing power and therefore on 
their spending [see Rehmus, Constraints on Local Government in Public Employee 
Bargaining, 67 MICH. L. REv. 919, 921-26 (1969)], and in light of the need for political 
appropriation of the bulk of local governments' spending, it seems highly unlikely 
that resort to political pressures will become less frequent once the right to strike is 
accepted. But see Note, supra note 68, at 561. 
73. The view that a public employee can be discharged for publicly criticizing his 
employer [see, e.g., Meehan v. Macy, 392 F.2d 822 (D.C. Cir. 1968), modified, No. 
20,812 (D.C. Cir., filed Aug. 23, 1968)] or for engaging in political activities [Adler v. 
Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952); McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 
29 N.E. 517 (1892)] has been placed in some doubt by recent decisions protecting 
public employees from such discharge. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 
(1968) (school teacher wrongfully discharged for writing public letters critical of school 
board); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (teacher wrongfully dis-
charged for refusal to sign loyalty oath); Swaaley v. United States, 376 F.2d 857 (Ct. 
CI. 1967) (federal employee wrongfully dismissed for writing letter to Secretary of 
Navy alleging favoritism in promotion). But cf. United Public Workers of America 
v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947), in which a divided Court upheld provisions of the 
Hatch Act [5 U.S.C. § 7324(a) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968)], restricting political acthities of 
federal employees. However, in the federal spheres, these restrictions are coupled with 
a positive right of public employees to petition Congress. 5 U.S.C. § 7102 (Supp. IV, 
1965-1968), formerly 37 Stat. 555 (1912). For discussion of the apparent erosion of 
restrictions on political activities of public employees, see Note, The First Amendment 
and Public Employees: Times Marches On, 57 GEO. L.J. 134 (1968). 
74. A glaring example of that possibility was the recent disclosure that a county 
supervisor in Wayne County, Michigan, concurrently held a position with a public 
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The bargaining leverage of a public employee union may be further 
increased by the employer's lack of certain ultimate deterrents pos-
sessed by many private employers. A private employer, if pushed 
to his economic limit, may move to a more favorable location, or 
go out of business, whereas, in the public sector, the government 
can be depended upon to remain in existence. 
If, through a misguided application of the private sector analogy, 
a broad strike power is added to these attributes of the public sec-
tor, the result may be to tip the balance of bargaining power so 
heavily in the union's favor that the employer will be forced to 
accede to excessive demands. The cost of meeting those demands 
could then be shifted either to public employees providing less 
vital services or to the city's taxpayers, since both groups usually 
lack countervailing political muscle.75 In such a case, recognition of 
the strike power may indeed prevent strikes, but only at the cost of 
fostering one-sided settlements. 
C. The Aid to Bargaining Approach 
Since neither the punitive approach nor recognition of the right 
to strike adequately accommodates the interests involved in labor 
relations in the public sector, the best remedial approach appears 
to be one that aims at balancing power at the bargaining stage.76 
employee union representing county employees. Detroit News, Feb. 9, 1969, at 6A, 
col. 3. 
75. Hildebrand, supra note 14, at 151. A peripheral effect of such shifting may be 
to accelerate the flight of business and large taxpayers to the suburbs, where their 
relative political power is likely to be much greater. In view of the pervasive concern 
for "the urban problem" it seems unwise to encourage the flight of taxpayers from 
the cities. 
76. Present collective bargaining laws tend, in a limited fashion, to promote a 
balance of bargaining power. At a minimum, they assure the right to union organiza-
tion and representation, thereby eliminating the necessity to strike over that funda-
mental issue. The traditional power advantage of the employer is further offset by 
those statutes which establish a comprehensive right to exclusive representation and 
which place the employer under a duty to bargain. Such laws emphasize promotion 
of settlements through negotiation rather than punishment of employees after a strike 
has occurred. Yet the simple right of representation, even when coupled with a duty 
to bargain, is not enough to achieve a balance of power. Especially when the em-
ployer has recourse to injunctive relief against strikes, he is unlikely to feel bound to 
bargain meaningfully. However, it is in precisely that situation in which the employer 
so retains the preponderance of bargaining power that employees are likely to resort 
to the strike because of the frustration of their bargaining objectives. Consequently, 
it seems that a statute granting bargaining rights which only partly offset the em-
ployer's advantage is in fact likely to increase the incidence of strikes because it 
promotes employee organization and, hence, a greater capacity to launch strikes. 
Thus Michigan, whose public employees enjoy relatively extensive bargaining rights, 
experienced more teachers' strikes in 1967-1968 than did any other state. Of 114 walk-
outs, forty-seven occurred in Michigan, followed by Ohio and Illinois with twelve each, 
Pennsylvania with six, and New York with five. GERR No. 276, at B-9 (Dec. 23, 1968). 
See also Anderson, Strikes and Impasse Resolution in Public Employment, 67 MICH. 
L. R.Ev. 943, 945 (1969). 
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When bargaining has been unsuccessful-whether due to an imbal-
ance in bargaining power permitting one party to refuse to com-
promise or due to a stand-off between parties of equal strength-it 
may be desirable to have some method of bringing objectivity into 
the situation. In this connection, resort has been made to other de-
vices in an attempt to avoid strikes while striving for an equitable 
settlement. Among the procedures which have been used to support 
the bargaining process in this manner are mediation, fact-finding, 
and arbitration. 
I. Mediation 
Mediation promotes settlements by introducing a third party 
who attempts to ease strained relations between the bargaining 
parties. The mediator, or conciliator, may act as an intermediary 
in communication between the bargaining parties, on the assump-
tion that a party will be more likely to accept a solution proffered 
by a neutral party than he is to accept the identical solution pro-
posed by his opponent. There is less reason for suspicion of a 
mediator's offer, and a party may more easily save face with his 
constituents by accepting the offer of a neutral. The mediator may 
also point the way to possible compromise, although his role is 
theoretically considered to be the passive one of helping the parties 
to agree on their own solutions. 
Mediation is widely used in public employee labor disputes, 
though present statutes vary as to the type of mediation available. 
Some merely permit the parties to consult outsiders;77 others pro-
vide a formal mediation service consisting of general labor medi-
ators78 or specialists in public employee disputes.79 Usually medi-
ation is available only when both parties seek it, but in Michigan 
it is available at the request of either party,80 and in New York it 
may be ordered by the state Public Employee Relations Board 
(PERB).81 
Mediation can be a highly useful aid to bargaining, particularly 
in the public sector where the bargaining parties are likely to be 
inexperienced.82 It can also help, to some extent, in lessening an 
77. E.g., CAL. GOVT. CODE § 3505.2 (West 1968). 
78. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 423.207, 423.25 (1967); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, 
§ 1705 (1969 Supp.), §§ 501-513 (1959); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.70 (1969). 
79. N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 209 (McKinney Supp. 1968). 
80. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 423.207 (1967). 
81. N.Y. CIV. SERv. LAW § 209 (McKinney Supp. 1968). 
82. In public employee disputes in which parties may be inexperienced bargainers, 
mediators serve as teachers as well as conciliators. A competent state mediation ser-
vice has been viewed as absolutely essential to the operation of a public employee 
collective bargaining statute. Yet many states provide none at all or, at best, an in-
effective service. See Address by Robert G. Howlett to the Federal Mediation and 
Concilation Service Seminar, GERR No. 286, at E-1 (March 3, 1969). 
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imbalance of power. For instance, when mediation is available at 
the request of either party, or when it can be ordered by the state, 
it will ensure that the parties are bargaining. On the other hand, 
those statutes which provide for mediation only upon the agree-
ment of both parties are of limited usefulness. When negotiations 
have broken down, a party may be reluctant to seek mediation for 
fear that his request might be interpreted as evidencing a desire 
to compromise his bargaining position. Moreover, even if one party 
does seek mediation, the other party may resist simply because of 
the adversary impulse fostered by the bargaining. Yet it is precisely 
at this point of impasse that mediation is most needed. At the very 
least, then, mediation should be available upon request of either 
party;83 and the better solution would be either to require medi-
ation at a certain stage in negotiations84 or to empower a state 
agency to order it.85 
2. Use of a Fact Finder 
The use of a fact finder or a fact-finding committee has been 
more effective in assisting bargaining than has mediation.86 That 
procedure, sometimes called "advisory arbitration,"87 combines ele-
ments of both mediation and arbitration. Unlike the mediator who 
works only with the parties' own proposals, the fact finder examines 
the merits of the dispute itself. Under the more formal approaches, 
the fact finder may conduct hearings, collect evidence, and have a 
subpoena power. 88 His recommendations, however, are not binding 
on the parties as in arbitration. At most, his findings may be used 
in reporting to a political authority,89 or in making a public rec-
ommendation to force public opinion against a recalcitrant party.90 
The use of a fact finder is primarily intended to prevent strikes 
83. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 423.207 (1967). 
84. See, e.g., Advisory Committee on Public Employee Relations, Report to Gov-
ernor George Romney 8 (1967) [hereinafter Michigan Report]. 
85. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAw § 209(3) (McKinney Supp. 1968). 
BG. See Belasco, Resolving Disputes over Contract Terms in the State Public Ser-
vice, 16 LAB. L.J. 533, 534 (1965). 
87. Id. at 533-40. 
88. The New York PERB is granted hearing and subpoena power [N.Y. CIV. SERV. 
LAW §§ 205(5)(j), (k) (McKinney Supp. 1968)], and may delegate its powers to fact-
finding boards [N.Y. Crv. SERv. LAw § 209(3)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1968)]; cf. Maryland 
Report, supra note 58, at AA-I, AA-7. See also Address by Robert G. Howlett to the 
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service Seminar, GERR No. 286, at E-6 (March 3, 
1969); '\VIS. STAT. ANN, § 111.88(2) (1969). 
89. It has been recommended that a report to the governor be the final step in the 
fact-finding process. Michigan Report, supra note 84, at 11. See, e.g., N.Y. Crv. SERv. 
LAW § 209(3){c) (McKinney Supp. 1968). 
90. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 423.25 (1967); N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAw § 209(c) 
(McKinney Supp. 1968). 
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by facilitating the settlement of disputes, but its effectiveness in this 
regard is not universally acknowledged. Those who charge that the 
formal fact-finding procedure tends to discourage rather than to 
promote negotiated agreement describe its negative effects in two 
ways. Their first contention is that the mere availability of a fact 
finder may induce the parties to rely upon that outside aid;91 if 
they do so, a basic virtue of collective bargaining--communication 
between the parties-is lost. Second, it is argued that the practice 
of making public recommendations may actually hinder agreement 
because those issues which might have been negotiable can no 
longer be conceded by the party favored in the fact finder's report 
without a public loss of face.92 
Nevertheless, these objections to the fact-finding process lose 
much of their force if certain distinctions bet\V'een the public and 
the private sector are taken into account. In the public sector, 
reaching a settlement by negotiation, although important, is less 
critical than it is in private employment. More important are the 
terms of that settlement: they should be equitable for both of the 
parties and for the taxpaying public. The use of a fact finder can 
help to create the balance of bargaining power necessary for such 
equitable settlements, because public disclosure of the merits of 
the dispute can serve to restrict the demands of a powerful union 
or to increase the offer of a powerful but politically conscious em-
ployer. 
Another factor which fundamentally alters the bargaining pro-
cess in the public sector is the existence of antistrike statutes. In the 
current political environment these statutes are not going to dis-
appear, 93 and it is not clear that they should. But given the con-
tinued existence of at least a nominal strike ban, the negotiation 
process in the public sector will remain inescapably different from 
that of private employment. The effectiveness of collective bargain-
ing depends to a large extent on the parties' evaluations of the rela-
tive costs of agreement and of disagreement; an employer, for 
example, must weigh the cost of a wage increase against the cost of 
a strike. When the cost of agreement is exceeded by the cost of 
disagreement, the party will usually settle. This process is some-
times not completed until a strike occurs, since at that time the rela-
91. The possibility of such overreliance on mediation and fact-finding is recog-
nized in the report of the Governor's Advisory Commission in Illinois. See Governor's 
Advisory Commission on Labor-Management Policy for Public Employees, Report 
and Recommendations 30 (1967). If that report were followed, the Illinois PERB would 
be empowered to withhold mediation when it finds that the parties have not in fact 
negotiated. See Note, supra note 68, at 566. A similar treatment is possible in Oregon 
where the fact-finding is wholly discretionary with the PERB. ORE. REv. STAT. 
§§ 243.7-.8 (1969 Supp.). 
92. See Kheel Report, supra note 38, at 33. 
93. See notes 62-63 supra and accompanying text. 
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tive costs become more easily ascertainable. However, in the public 
sector, the process of cost assessment cannot function in a similar 
manner because in that setting the strike is not an acceptable al-
ternative to agreement. Consequently, the process of bargaining in 
the public. sector may afford fewer incentives for settlement than 
does its private sector counterpart. 
Once it is realized that these limitations on bargaining in the 
public sector exist, resort to forces which complement the bargain-
ing of the parties becomes less distasteful. Moreover, when the fact-
finding procedure is viewed in terms of the basic goals of strike 
prevention and fair settlements, rather than in terms of bargaining 
orthodoxy, it is clear that fact-finding is on balance desirable. What-
ever disadvantages it may have in terms of inhibiting negotiations 
are compensated for by its tendency to balance bargaining power 
and to prevent strikes. Experience indicates that the use of a fact 
finder is a successful method of strike prevention. In many cases in 
which that device has been instituted, agreement has been reached 
prior to the issuance of any report;94 and when impasse has con-
tinued up to the recommendation stage, the fact finder's recom-
mendations have usually been accepted by the parties.95 
3. Arbitration 
The use of a fact finder, however, even when accompanied by 
public disclosure, does not always provide sufficient pressure to 
break a bargaining impasse. Consequently, commentators have sug-
gested compulsory arbitration of disputes, and it has been asserted 
that binding arbitration is the only effective alternative to recogni-
tion of a right to strike.96 
There are nv-o general types of arbitration-"interests" and 
"grievance." "Interests" arbitration decides the substantive terms of 
a new contract, thereby resolving a bargaining impasse, whereas 
94. In Massachusetts, for example, out of 200 cases submitted to fact finders in a 
two-year period, 140 were resolved prior to the issuance of recommendations. In 
Michigan, 56% of such cases were resolved prior to recommendations.· Somewhat less 
success was experienced in Connecticut where twenty-six out of fifty-seven were resolved 
prior to recommendations, and in New York where only thirty-three out of 150 cases 
were settled prior to the fact finder's recommendations. GERR No. 283, at B-3 (Feb. 
10, 1969). Perhaps significantly, the higher success rates were in those states combining 
mediation with fact-finding. 
95. For example, out of fifty cases in '\Visconsin in the two-year period, the fact 
finder's recommendations were accepted in 90% of them, and in only three cases 
were strikes experienced. In Massachusetts, fact-finding was used in 200 cases, but 
only four strikes ensued. GERR No. 283, at B-2, B-3 (Feb. 10, 1969). 
96. See, e.g., R. DOHERTY &: '\\T. OBERER, TEACHERS, SCHOOL BOARDS, AND COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING: A CHANGING OF THE GUARD 104 (1967); Shenton, Compulsory Arbitration 
in the Public Service, 17 LAB. L.J. 138 (1966); Note, Legality and Propriety of Agree-
ments To Arbitrate Major and Minor Disputes in Public Employment, 54 CORNELL L. 
REV. 129 (1968). 
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"grievance" arbitration settles disputes over the interpretation of 
an existing contract. 97 Although the latter type has been used much 
more frequently than has the former, it is submitted that the use 
of interests arbitration could beneficially be expanded in the public 
setting, at least with respect to critical employees such as police and 
firemen. 
The machinery of arbitration is similar to that of the fact-finding 
process. It may take three general forms. First, there is the ad hoc 
tripartite approach in which each party chooses one member of the 
panel and those two panel members then pick a third disinterested 
member.98 A second approach seeks the services of an outside pro-
fessional arbitrator, usually chosen by agreement of the parties to 
the dispute.99 In a third approach, most appropriate when there is 
compulsory arbitration, an outside body selects the arbitrator.100 
Arbitration may be either compulsory or voluntary. Compulsory 
arbitration, in spite of its apparent attractiveness, has seldom been 
used to resolve bargaining impasses in public employment, although 
some states do provide for compulsory arbitration of impasses for 
certain critical employees such as policemen and firemen,101 public 
transportation workers,102 public utilities workers,1°3 and hospital 
97. Several courts have inferred from comprehensive bargaining laws imposing a 
duty to bargain that public employers are permitted to enter grievance arbitration 
agreements. See, e.g., Oakland County Sheriff's Dept. v. Local 23, AFSCME, No. C-66, 
F-63 (Mich. Lab. Med. Bd.), reprinted in GERR No. 227, at F-1 (Jan. 8, 1968); Local 
953, AFSCME v. Benton ·Harbor School Dist., Civil No. 6229(B) (Mich. Cir. Ct. for 
Berrien County Oct. 12, 1967), reprinted in GERR No. 216, at E-1 (Oct. 30, 1967); 
Local 1226, AFSCME v. City of Rhinelander, 35 Wis. 2d 209, 151 N.W.2d 30 (1967). 
The New York statute has been similarly interpreted [see GERR No. 228, at E-1 (Jan. 
22, 1967)], and a like statute is in force in New Hampshire. See Tremblay v. Berlin 
Police Union, 237 A.2d 668 (N.H. 1968). Some states specifically allow grievance 
arbitration. E.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 290.350 (1965); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 178k 
(Supp. 1968). See generally Note, supra note 51; Note, Labor Law-Public Employ-
ment-Arbitration and Agency Shops As Mandatory Subjects of Bargaining, 14 WAYNE 
L. RJ::v. 1238 (1968). 
98. The new Michigan police and firemen's arbitration statute [Pub. L. No. 312 
(Aug. 14, 1969)] has adopted this procedure as has the respective Pennsylvania statute 
[PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 217 (Supp. 1969)]. The procedure is also in use in Minnesota 
for hospital employees [MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.36 (1966)]. 
99. The ordinary procedure in this situation is for the parties to request a list of 
professional arbitrators from a service, such as the American Arbitration Association, 
and to choose a mutually satisfactory arbitrator from that list. See Coulson, Labor 
Arbitration-The Insecure Profession, in PRoc. OF N.Y.U. 20rH ANNUAL CONFERENCE 
ON l.ABOR 131 (1967). 
100. The analogous fact-finding procedure is present in New York where the 
PERB orders fact-finding and selects the fact finder. N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 209 (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1968). 
101. E.g., Mich. Pub. L. No. 312 (Aug. 14, 1969); PA. STAT. ANN. tit, 43, § 217 
(Supp. 1969); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 28-9.19 (1968) (fire fighters); WYO. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 27-265 to -276 (1957). 
102. LA. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 23.890(e) (Supp. 1969); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 55, § 563.2 
(1964) (toll bridges and toll roads). 
103. NEB, RJ::v. STAT. §§ 48-801 to -823 (1968). 
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employees.104 Moreover, there are very few states that have pro-
visions even for voluntary arbitration.105 In general, statutes pur-
porting to provide for arbitration tend to do very little.106 Although 
they use the language of arbitration, their procedures are usually 
not binding,107 binding only upon the employees,1°8 or binding 
solely for a limited range of issues such as those "not involving ex-
penditures of money."109 
Reluctance to use arbitration to resolve public employment dis-
putes arises from three factors. First, there is a traditional concern 
that provisions for the arbitration of public employment disputes 
may constitute an unconstitutional delegation of authority.110 Sec-
ond, even if there is no legal obstacle, there is a conviction that the 
availability of a decision by an arbitrator will discourage serious 
efforts at collective bargaining.111 Finally, there may be some feeling 
that it is undesirable to leave essentially political decisions-such 
as those concerning how much public employees will be paid and 
under what conditions they will work-to one who is not directly 
responsible to the public.112 
104. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.36 (1966), upheld in Fairview Hosp. Assn. v. Public 
Bldg. Serv. &: Hosp. Employees, Local 113, 241 l\Iinn. 523, 64 N.W.2d 16 (1954), noted 
in 39 Minn. L. Rev. 322 (1955). 
105. Aus. STAT, § 23.40-010 (1959); !LL. REV. STAT. ch. 111%, § 301 (1960); NEB. 
REv. STAT, §§ 48-801 to -823 (1968); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13a-7 (1965); N.Y. Civ. SERv. 
LAW § 207 (McKinney Supp. 1968). 
106. "Arbitration" like "collective bargaining" tends to become a platitude, given 
lip service but not substance, by both legislators and study commissions. Thus, some 
statutes grant collective bargaining rights without allowing the strike which would 
give the rights substance and without providing sufficient controls to make the 
process effective. The New York legislature, recognizing that the provisions of its 
Taylor Law did not allow real collective bargaining, substituted its own platitudinous 
phrase "collective negotiations." N.Y. CIV. SERv. I.Aw § 203 (McKinney Supp. 1968). 
Similarly, a proposed Pennsylvania law required as a final step in negotiations that 
there be "binding arbitration" except for police and firemen. But it would then 
have emasculated that provision by making the arbitrator's decision purely advisory, 
except with respect to determinations which did not require legislative action in order 
to be effective. Proposed Pennsylvania Public Employee Bargaining Law § 807(a), re-
printed in GERR No. 267, at E-5 (Oct. 21, 1968). 
107. In effect, such advisory arbitration is the same as fact-finding. See, e.g., l\Ie. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 26, §§ 980-990 (Supp. 1968) (fire fighters); See also Proposed Penn-
sylvania Public Employee Bargaining Law § 807(a), reprinted in GERR No. 267, at 
E-1 (Oct. 21, 1968). See generally :Belasco, supra note 86, at 533-44. 
108. E.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 29-9.3-.12 (1968) (arbitration binding on teachers 
and on school board except as to matters "involving expenditure of money"). Cf. 
Proposed Pennsylvania Public Employee Bargaining Law § 807(a), reprinted in GERR 
No. 267, at E-1 (Oct. 21, 1968) (arbitration binding on employer except as to matters 
requiring legislative enactment). 
109. R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 28-9.4-11 to -13 (1968). 
ll0. The delegation of power doctrine is no longer very important in the federal 
setting, but state courts have been slow to discard it. K. DAVIS, .ADMINISTRATIVE I.Aw 
TREATISE § 2.15 (1968). 
Ill. See text following note 144 infra. 
112. See text accompanying note 145 infra. 
282 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 68:260 
The first of these factors is supported by most older cases,113 but 
recent cases have shown a greater acceptance of both grievance114 
and, to a lesser extent, interests arbitration.115 Moreover, most of 
the cases in which arbitration has been held an impermissible dele-
gation are distinguishable from those that would arise in the present 
setting in that in those cases there was no statute authorizing even 
public employee bargaining, much less arbitration. Since, under 
such circumstances bargaining itself could be construed as an 
impermissible delegation,116 it followed logically that an agreement 
to submit disputes to arbitration was likewise invalid.117 
The extent to which the delegation problem may preclude ap-
plication of interests arbitration to public employee bargaining 
disputes depends initially upon the extent to which the decision 
of the arbitrator may be binding upon the governmental authority. 
In the absence of a statute specifically authorizing interests arbitra-
tion it is unlikely that a governmental authority can be bound by 
an arbitrator's decision.118 Although with respect to grievance arbi-
tration the power to agree to such arbitration may be inferred from 
a collective bargaining statute,119 that logical nexus is not so ap-
parent in the case of interests arbitration. Interests arbitration 
arguably bypasses bargaining and thereby deviates altogether from 
the purpose of the collective bargaining statute.120 
113. See, e.g., Fellows v. LaTronica, 151 Colo. 300, 377 P.2d 547 (1962); Washington 
ex rel. Everett Firefighters, Local 350 v. Johnson, 46 Wash. 114, 278 P.2d 662 (1955) 
(city charter provision for compulsory arbitration of firemen's wage dispute held 
unlawful delegation of power). See also Van Riper v. Traffic Tel. Workers Fedn., 2 
N.J. 335, 66 A.2d 161 (1949). 
114. See, e.g., Local 1226, AFSCME v. City of Rhinelander, 35 Wis. 2d 209, 151 
N.W .2d 30 (1969); Local 953, AFSCME v. Benton Harbor School Dist., Civil No. 
6229(B) (Mich. Cir. Ct. for Berrien County Oct. 12, 1967), reprinted in GERR 
No. 216, at E-1 (Oct. 30, 1967); Tremblay v. Berlin Police Union, 237 A.2d 668 (N.H. 
1968). 
115. See, e.g., City of Warwick v. Warwick Regular Firemen's Assn., 256 A.2d 206 
(R.I. 1969). See also Shenton, Compulsory Arbitration in the Public Service, 17 I.All. 
L.J. 138 (1966); Note, supra note 96. Before the City of Warwick case, the authorities 
usually cited in support of the validity of public employees' interests arbitration 
were Fairview Hosp. Assn. v. Public Bldg. Serv. & Hosp. Employees, Local 113, 241 
Minn. 523, 64 N.W.2d 16 (1954), and New Jersey Bell Tel. Co. v. Communications 
Workers of America, N.J. Traffic Div. No. 55, 5 N.J. 354, 75 A.2d 721 (1950). But those 
cases are of doubtful relevance since they did not involve public employees, but private 
employees engaged in critical occupations. 
116. See, e.g., Railway Mail Assn. v. Murphy, 180 Misc. 868, 44 N.Y.S.2d 601 (1943), 
revd. on other grounds, 326 U.S. 88 (1945). 
117. See, e.g., Operating Engineers, Local 321 v. Water Works Bd., 276 Ala. 462, 
163 S.2d 619 (1964). See also Note, supra note 96. 
118. See, e.g., Washington ex rel. Everett Firefighters, Local 350 v. Johnson, 46 
Wash. 114, 278 P.2d 662 (1955); Fellows v. LaTronica, 151 Colo. 300, 377 P.2d 547 
(1962). 
119. See note 106 supra. 
120. For the opposite view, see Note, supra note 96, at 138. 
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But even when there is statutory authorization for interests arbi-
tration, that authorization raises serious delegation problems, whose 
resolution depends in part upon the form of the statute. Such legis-
lation can provide for arbitration that is (1) totally voluntary, that 
is, upon the agreement of both parties; (2) semi-voluntary, that is, 
upon request by a single party; or (3) compulsory. All three cate-
gories have in common certain delegation problems, which may be 
divided into two general types: those concerning the delegation of 
power from one branch of government to another, and those con-
cerning the abdication of governmental responsibility to an out-
sider. For example, a statute which permits parties to engage in 
voluntary interests arbitration might be viewed as permitting an 
unconstitutional delegation from one branch of government to an-
other, since the local executive, by agreeing to_ the arbitration, could 
bind other divisions of government. However, a statute specifically 
providing that arbitration would be binding upon all branches of a 
local government should validate the arbitration against this dele-
gation objection, because, to the extent that the state legislature 
can control the distribution of local governmental power, it would 
be similarly empowered to delegate that power within a particular 
governmental unit. 
But even if the arbitration decision can properly bind both the 
local legislative body and the executive, its effectiveness will be 
limited unless the decision is to take precedence over state restric-
tions on the local government's powers. For example, the scope of 
employee relations in local government is often limited by state 
laws controlling civil service standards or retirement plans.121 Al-
though disputes over these matters seemingly relate to "wages and 
conditions of employment" which comprise the subject matter of 
bargaining under the public employee statutes,122 they are beyond 
the scope of a local government's bargaining power.123 Conse-
quently, they would presumably also be beyond arbitration, at least 
under a statute which merely permitted local governments to agree 
to interests arbitration. Other state-imposed limitations may restrict 
the binding ability of arbitration even as to matters more purely 
local in nature. For example, when there are state restrictions on 
local taxing power or on tax rates, a municipality may find it legally 
impossible to comply with the economic burdens of an arbitration 
decision.124 
121. For discussion of restriction on local government, see Rehmus, Constraints on 
Local Governments in Public Employee Bargaining, 67 MICH. L. R.Ev. 919 (1969). 
122. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.213 (1967); N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAw § 204 
(1968). 
123. See Rehmus, supra note 121, at 926-29. 
124. Id. at 921-26. 
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For arbitration to enjoy maximum effectiveness as a strike sub-
stitute, then, it would have to bind state government as well as 
local. A recent Pennsylv~nia arbitration statute applying to disputes 
with police and firemen purports to have that effect.125 But an arbi-
tration statute so drawn would seem to be subject to the second 
delegation objection, that of abdication of governmental responsi-
bility. As it applies to the local level, that objection may be weak-
ened if the state statute makes arbitration compulsory. A voluntary 
arbitration law might be viewed as in effect permitting government 
officials to abdicate their responsibility for the cost of governmental 
operations. But when arbitration is compelled by law, the abdica-
tion argument loses much of its force. The local official will then 
have not abdicated his responsibility; instead, his responsibility will 
have been removed ~y a higher governmental authority.126 
Yet the objection might be raised that the higher governmental 
authority which has ordered the arbitration has itself abdicated its 
responsibility by delegating it to an outside party. To the extent 
that this objection has merit, however, it can be avoided if the arbi-
tration is governmental in nature.127 Thus, arbitration might prop-
erly be conducted by a state labor board, by a public employment 
board, or perhaps by a "labor court."128 
But even governmental arbitration must withstand attack on 
125. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 217.1-.12 (Supp. 1969), provides that the decision 
by a tripartite board of arbitration, chosen by the parties, shall be binding, and 
that if legislative action is required to meet the arbitration award, the state or local 
legislative body must take appropriate action within a specified period of time. 
126. In some instances, it may be doubtful that the state legislature can properly 
remove that local responsibility. In states whose constitutions guarantee hoine rule to 
certain cities, the legislature may be constitutionally unable to alter the allocation of 
responsibility within city governments by requiring those governments to submit their 
labor disputes to binding arbitration. Where home rule is not constitutionally guar-
anteed, however, home rule charters will not bar arbitration. See, e.g., PA. STAT, 
ANN. tit. 43, § 217.9 (Supp. 1969) (arbitration statute applicable despite any existing 
or future home rule charters). 
127. In the recent case of City of Warwick v. Warwick Regular Firemen's Assn., 
256 A.2d 206 (R.I. 1969), the Supreme Court of Rhode Island found that arbitration 
by a tripartite panel with the third party chosen by the parties to bargaining was 
governmental in nature and thus not an impermissible delegation of governmental 
authority. While the result in that case may or may not be desirable, the court's 
reasoning is wholly tautological. The court answered the argument that the arbitra-
tion constituted a delegation to a private person by reasoning that since the statute 
authorized whomever might be chosen as arbitrator to receive a portion of the state's 
sovereign power, that person was therefore made a public officer. As such, he was clearly 
not a private person, and hence there was no impermissible delegation of governmental 
authority to a private person. 256 A.2d at 210-11. 
128. Cf. NEB. R.Ev. STAT. § 48-820 (1968) (arbitration by court of industrial rela-
tions). See generally Fleming, The Labor Court Idea, 65 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1551 (1967). 
Such a court might be analogous to the Civil Service Commissions, which have au-
thority to determine wages, hours, and conditions of employment, are semi-auton-
omous, and have not been held an invalid delegation of legislative responsibility. 
See Shenton, Compulsory Arbitration in the Public Seroice, 17 LAB. L.J. 1118, 143 
(1966). 
December 1969] Comments 285 
grounds of improper delegation of legislative authority. The tradi-
tional means by which a legislative delegation is justified is by 
including in the delegating statute sufficient "standards" to guide 
the body which is to exercise the legislative authority.129 In the pub-
lic employee situation, it is unclear what these standards must be. 
Standards developed in cases involving nonpublic employees 
engaged in critical occupations, such as communications workers130 
or hospital employees,131 are of uncertain relevance, because the 
cases involved substantially different issues than those in a public 
employee arbitration case.132 In light of the apparent propensity 
129. In New Jersey v. Traffic Tel. Workers' Fedn., 2 N.J. 335, 66 A.2d 616 (1949), the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey held that a statute requiring compulsory arbitration 
of labor disputes in public communications was invalid because of a lack of standards. 
But an amended version of the statute, which included standards to guide the decision 
of the arbitrator, was upheld in New Jersey Bell Tel. Co. v. Communication '\Vorkers 
of America, N.J. Traffic Div. No. 55, 5 N.J. 354, 75 A.2d 721 (1950). See also City of 
Warwick v. Warwick Regular Firemen's Assn., 256 A.2d at 210 (R.I. 1969); K. DAVIS, 
.ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.15 (1958). 
130. In the context of public utility disputes, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
found to be adequate, those standards which required the arbitrator to consider: (1) the 
interests and welfare of the public; (2) a comparison of wages, hours, and conditions 
of employment of the employees involved in the arbitration proceedings with those of 
other employees doing comparable work; and (3) "[o]ther factors ••• traditionally taken 
into consideration in determination of wages, hours, and conditions of employment 
through voluntary collective bargaining." New Jersey Bell Tel. Co. v. Communication 
Workers of America, N.J. Traffic Div. No. 55, 5 N.J. 354, 371, 75 A.2d 721, 729 (1950). 
131. In Fairview Hosp. Assn. v. Public Bldg. Serv. &: Hosp. Employees, Local 113, 
241 Minn. 523, 64 N.W.2d 16 (1954), the Minnesota Supreme Court permitted even 
vaguer standards, finding sufficient the statutory statement of general labor policy: 
to protect and promote the interests of public, employees, and employers alike; 
to promote industrial peace, regular and adequate income for employees, and un-
interrupted production of goods and services; to reduce menace to health and 
welfare, and morals ..• arising from economic insecurity due to stoppages ••• 
of business and employment. 
241 Minn. at 546, 6·1 N.W.2d at 30-31. 
132. One issue involved in nongovernmental employee cases concerns the general 
propriety of arbitration as a means of deciding justifiable disputes. See New Jersey 
Bell Tel. Co. v. Communications Workers of America, N.J. Traffic Div. No. 55, 5 N.J. 
354, 75 A.2d 72 (1950). At one time, private sector arbitration was viewed as an in-
fringement upon the judiciary. See, e.g., Boston Printing Pressman's Union v. Potter 
Press, 141 F. Supp. 553 (D. Mass.), afjd., 241 F.2d 787 (1st Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 
U.S. 817 (1957). See generally Cushman, Voluntary Arbitration of New Contract Terms 
-A Forum in Search of a Dispute, 16 LAB. L.J. 765 (1967). Another issue in such cases 
concerns compensation for governmental "taking" of a private employee's right to 
strike. In Fairview Hosp. Assn. v. Public Bldg. Serv. &: Hosp. Employees, Local 113, 
241 Minn. 523, 64 N.W.2d 16 (1954), the court felt that the use of arbitration was a 
necessary substitute for the employee's relinquishment of the right to strike. The dis-
tinction between that situation and the governmental employment situation is thus 
clear, for the governmental employee has no "right" to strike, whereas the private 
employee has a recognized right, albeit a limited one. The private employee's right 
to strike resembles a property right subject to taking under the police power only in 
a manner consistent with fourteenth amendment due process requirements-that is, 
the right must not be "arbitrarily and unjustly withdrawn," and there should be "a 
substantial and reasonable substitute for the rights withdrawn." 241 Minn. at 543, 64 
N.W.2d at 27. Hence, in the private sector, a provision for compulsory arbitration 
takes on the nature of compensation for loss of the right to strike. 
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of some state courts to find improper delegations in arbitration of 
public employee bargaining disputes,133 it seems unlikely that the 
vague standards developed in the nongovernmental context134 would 
be adequate. 
Statutory standards to guide and control arbitration vary 
widely, ranging from none at all in Pennsylvania135 to highly 
detailed standards in Michigan136 and Rhode Island.137 Some in-
dication of what standards will be accepted for arbitration of gov-
ernment employee disputes appeared in a recent Rhode Island 
case.138 In that case, the state supreme court upheld compulsory 
arbitration of a firemen's wage dispute, basing its decision on a stat-
ute which required that a tripartite arbitration panel consider as 
factors: (I) a comparison with prevailing wage rates and conditions 
of employment in building trades in the local area; (2) comparison 
with firemen's wage rates in surrounding towns of comparable size; 
and (3) the interest and welfare of the public, hazards of the em-
ployment, and qualifications and skills of the employees.139 
The criteria which have been developed in reference to the use of a 
fact finder may offer some additional guide as to what standards will 
suffice in the arbitration context. Only three states furnish statutory 
criteria for the fact finder. Statutes in Maine and Rhode Island concen-
trate on comparison with private employment situations, with only 
a vague reference to "the public interest and welfare," whereas Minne-
sota's statute appears more applicable to the delegation problem 
which is encountered when the arbitration is to be binding.140 Under 
Minnesota's statute, the fact-finding panel is required to consider 
tax limitations imposed by charter on the local government, wage-
hour comparisons with employees of other governmental agencies, 
internal consistency of treatment of employees in the several classes,141 
133. See, e.g., Fellows v. LaTronica, 151 Colo. 300, 377 P.2d 547 (1962); Washington 
ex rel. Everett Firefighters, Local 350 v. Johnson, 46 Wash. 114, 278 P.2d 662 (1955). 
134. See notes 130-31 supra. 
135. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 217.1-.10 (Supp. 1969). 
136. MICH. Co?.n>. LAws ANN. § 423.239 (Supp. 1969). 
137. R.I. GEN. STATS. ANN. §§ 28-9.1-10 (Supp. 1969). 
138. City of Warwick v. Warwick Regular Firemen's Assn., 256 A.2d 206 (R.I. 
1969). 
139. 256 A.2d at 211-12. 
140. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 26, § 989 (Supp. 1968) (fire fighters); R.I. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 28-9.3-9 (1968) (teachers); R.I. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 28-9.4-10 (1968) (municipal em-
ployees); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.57(4) (1966). See generally Krinsky, Public Employ-
ment Fact-Finding in Fourteen States, 17 LABOR L.J. 532, 539 (1966). 
141. This consideration is important in light of the "leapfrogging" situation con• 
fronting municipal employers-with a multiplicity of bargaining units, a settlement 
with one is likely to set the floor for negotiations with other groups. If arbitration is 
to be binding but is to stay within the limits of a city's tax structure, it will be 
necessary for the arbitrator to consider the peripheral as well as the immediate effects 
of his decision. A decision which grants a large pay increase to police, for example, 
may work to the relative detriment of another group in later negotiations, because 
the city may be then financially incapable of giving a comparable increase. 
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and other factors normally considered by the governmental agency 
in its employment relationships.142 
Standards such as those in the Minnesota statute appear to satisfy 
best the delegation requirement, as long as the arbitration is done 
by a governmental agency and procedural safeguards are provided. 
Those safeguards might include -written findings by the arbitrator 
and the availability of judicial review to ensure adherence to the 
statutory criteria.143 By requiring consideration of the tax and 
charter limitations on the local government, such standards would 
preclude arbitration decisions which require state legislative action 
-a limitation which is necessary to avoid the argument that a legis-
lature cannot bind itself to enact future legislation to be suggested 
by an outside party. In effect, then, an arbitration statute limited to 
matters within the power of the local governmental unit restricts 
arbitration to those matters over which there is local collective bar-
gaining authority. Arbitration so restricted is not completely satis-
factory as an alternative to the strike power, for while such arbitra-
tion cannot change a state law restricting local government, the 
strike and its attendant political measures can bring about that 
change.144 However, it is not yet certain that in order to overcome 
objections based on the grounds of improper delegation, arbitration 
must be restricted to this degree. 
Even if there is no legal obstacle, the wisdom of relying upon 
arbitration to achieve a balance of bargaining power might still 
be questioned. Arbitration, like fact-finding, presents the possi-
bility that the parties ·will not really negotiate, but rather will pre-
fer to rely upon the arbitrator. That fear seems especially relevant 
to the public employee situation in which the bargainers may be 
inexperienced. 
Moreover, the policy considerations behind the argument that 
the government's resort to arbitration is an abdication of its re-
142. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.57(4) (1966). 
143. A related question concerns the extent to which judicial review should be 
available. The Pennsylvania statute expressly prohibits judicial review. PA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 43, § 217.7 (Supp. 1969). The Michigan arbitration statute, on the other hand, 
provides for judicial review, but only on the questions whether the panel exceeded 
its jurisdiction, whether it entered an order unsupported by substantial evidence in 
the record, or whether it entered an order procured by fraud or other unlawful 
means. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.242 (1967). 
144. That fact is exemplified by the New York transit workers strike under the 
Condon-Wadlin Law, Law of March 27, 1947, ch. 391, [1947] N.Y. Laws 842, as 
amended, Law of April 23, 1963, ch. 702, [1963] N.Y. Laws 2432 (repealed 1967). The 
transit authority was barred by state law from granting any pay increase whatsoever 
to those who had engaged in the strike. But the trains were stopped, and the city 
was paralyzed. The ensuing political repercussions produced what was in effect a 
special legislative dispensation-a wage settlement which was a legislated exception 
to the Condon-Wadlin law. Arbitration could not have produced a settlement under 
those conditions; only the political coercion of the strike produced the necessary 
statutory change. See Kheel, Strikes and Public Employment, 67 MICH. L. REv. 931, 933 
(1969). 
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sponsibility apply even though the delegation is kept within consti-
tutional limits. By relying upon arbitration, a governmental official 
can avoid an unpleasant decision for which he would othenvise be 
politically accountable. Although the effect may not necessarily be 
the raising of taxes by an unaccountable arbitrator, the decision 
may well affect the allocation of governmental expenditures within 
a political unit.145 Such a decision arguably should remain with 
those who are politically accountable for it. 
In light of the possible adverse effects of arbitration, it seems 
advisable that it be used sparingly in resolving labor disputes in 
public employment. Perhaps it should remain limited to employee 
groups such as policemen and firemen, for whom the strike is com-
pletely unacceptable.146 But in whatever situations it is used, arbi-
tration cannot be fully adequate as a strike substitute. Nor should 
it be viewed as the exclusive means of dispute resolution. Rather, it 
should be part of a comprehensive bargaining scheme in which 
arbitration, or preferably, the threat of arbitration, could prevent 
either party from having an overwhelming bargaining advantage, 
and could encourage the parties to reach an equitable settlement. 
D. The Unfair Labor Practice Proceeding 
Another possible device which may prove useful in promoting 
effective collective bargaining for public employees while avoiding 
strikes is the unfair labor practice proceeding. The remedy pro-
vided by such a proceeding is potentially important, particularly in 
a comprehensive collective bargaining program. Like arbitration, 
however, it is presently available in only a few states; and even 
where the remedy can be sought, as in Michigan, it may be avail-
able only to the union.147 
Typically, unfair labor practice procedures are modeled after 
those of the NLRA,148 and permit an aggrieved party to bring ac-
tions before a quasi-judicial body, charging the violation of specific 
statutory prohibitions. That procedure is most effective in perform-
ing such functions as enforcing recognition and enjoining antiunion 
discrimination. But because of timing and enforcement problems, it 
has limited usefulness at the bargaining stage. Since the administra-
tive machinery is incapable of acting on short notice, charges filed 
145. This danger could perhaps be partially alleviated by the utilization of arbi• 
tration standards which seek to prevent disrupting the relative standings of employee 
groups. See note 141 supra. 
146. See, e.g., the Pennsylvania and Michigan arbitration statutes dealing with 
police and firemen. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 217.1-.10 (Supp. 1969); l\lICH. COlllP. 
LAWS ANN. § 423.231 (1967). 
147. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 423.216 (1967). 
148. NLRA § 8, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1964). See generally Smith, Unfair Labor Practices 
in Public Employment, GERR No. 268, at E-1 (Oct. 28, 1968). 
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during the course of bargaining are unlikely to be disposed of until 
the contract deadline has passed and the public has suffered the 
adverse consequences of the parties' disagreement. Moreover, even 
if the case is decided in time, the enforcement powers of the adjudi-
cating body are often inadequate, particularly when the charge 
alleges a failure to bargain in good faith. The Michigan State Labor 
Mediation Board, for example, is not legally empowered to order a 
settlement in that situation; instead, enforcement is limited to 
issuing "cease and desist" orders, the continued violation of which 
may result in contempt penalties.149 The threat of such restraining 
orders may help to equalize bargaining power, but the delay before 
sanctions are imposed renders that threat less effective as a preven-
tive measure. 
Nevertheless, the unfair labor practice proceeding may accom-
plish a useful publicity function similar to that of a fact finder's 
recommendations. When time permits a decision to be rendered 
during the course of bargaining, posting or publication of that de-
cision may be ordered,150 and the resulting pressure from public 
opinion can exert a beneficial influence on subsequent negotiations. 
If the fact-finding process is also available, however, it seems 
wasteful to seek an unfair labor practice remedy whose primary 
advantage is already available thrqugh fact-finding. Of course, the 
remedy itself is not useless, but its shortcomings point out the neces-
sity of developing more effective methods of using such bargaining 
controls. 
IV. THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO LABOR RELATIONS 
IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
A. Application of Collective Bargaining Aids 
The basic objections to the use of aids to collective bargaining 
is that they are ineffective because of poor timing, inadequate 
staffing, haphazard application, and the absence of a comprehensive 
and integrated approach to the settlement of labor disputes. If the 
use of aids to bargaining, such as mediation and fact-finding, de-
pends upon the request of one or both of the parties, those proce-
dures may not be invoked at all,151 or may be invoked at such a 
late stage in the negotiations that they cannot be effective.152 Conse-
149. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 423.216 (1967). 
150. For example, the Michigan Labor Mediation Board, in holding that a school 
board's practice of mailing its latest offer directly to teachers was an unfair labor 
practice, ordered its remedial order to be posted in the school. Morenci Educ. Assn., 
No. C-68, H-96 (Mich. Lab. Med. Bd. Dec. 12, 1968), reprinted in GERR No. 281, at 
B-2 Gan. 27, 1969). 
151. See notes 82-85 supra and accompanying text. 
152. For example, when the fact-finding procedure is not invoked by a party until 
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quently, state statutes should establish governmental regulatory 
bodies, authorized to provide services to aid bargaining, and em-
powered to require their use when agreement has not been reached 
by a specified time prior to the contract or budget submission dead-
line.1csa . 
In the past, the administration of bargaining aids furnished by 
public agencies has been hampered by a lack of the competent per-
sonnel and adequate staffing necessary to provide prompt and effi-
cient implementation. After enactment of Michigan's PERA, for 
example, the Michigan Labor Mediation Board, which is responsi-
ble for furnishing mediation and fact-finding services and for 
handling recognition and election proceedings, found itself so in-
undated with both types of requests that it was often unable to meet 
the demand.154 Undeniably, providing better services means in-
creased cost; but in light of the cost of strikes which those proce-
dures are designed to prevent, spending more for prevention is 
preferable and justifiable. 
The need for prompt service, competent personnel, and an in-
tegrated approach to public employment labor problems lends sup-
port to the proposal that such services should be rendered by a state 
agency specializing in labor relations in the public sector. Such an 
approach can offer the advantage of specialization. Certain aspects of 
public employment, such as the political element, the strike prohibi-
a strike is imminent, it is unlikely that there will be time for the fact finder to make 
an adequate investigation and a thoughtful report. Instead, the process will tum into 
intensive mediation, concentrated on averting the impending strike, rather than on 
considering the merits of the dispute. That situation is said to be present in Michigan. 
See Howlett, supra note 82. 
153. Mandatory application of outside bargaining aids was suggested in the Mich-
igan Report, supra note 84, at 8-9, and in the Pennsylvania Governor's proposed stat-
ute, Pa. H.B. No. 2834, § 801 (1968), reprinted in GERR No. 267, at E-1, E-3 (Oct. 
21, 1968). In New York, the PERB has discretion to order mediation and fact-finding, 
but is not required to do so at any specified time. N.Y. C1v. SERv. LAw § 209 (McKin-
ney Supp. 1968). 
A drawback to the application of bargaining aids on a timetable basis is that the 
certainty of their availability may impair the bargaining process. That objection is 
particularly troublesome if arbitration is available, for arbitration is most helpful to 
bargaining when its availability is uncertain. The threat of arbitration can help 
balance bargaining power, but neither party can cease bargaining in reliance 
upon its availability. This uncertainty can be achieved by making arbitration discre-
tionary with a governmental regulatory body, such as New York's PERB. N.Y. C1v. 
SERv. LAw § 205 (McKinney Supp. 1968). Of course, uncertainty concerning the avail• 
ability of arbitration may be difficult to maintain in the case of critical employees 
such as police and firemen. But even in that situation, reliance upon its availability 
may be discouraged by providing a comprehensive bargaining program aimed at 
making arbitration unnecessary, and by making arbitration relatively less attractive 
by having the parties bear the costs of the service. 
154. In 1967, for example, the Michigan State Labor Mediation Board received 
requests for mediation at double the 1966 rate, and it received representation peti-
tions at a rate four times that of the previous year. The volume of cases created a 
severe backlog. See Michigan Report, App. E, supra note 84. · 
December 1969] Comments 291 
tion, limitations on local governmental authority, and elements of 
social conflict serve to distinguish it sharply from its private sector 
counterpart. Consequently, specialized expertise beyond that ac-
quired in private sector practice is required to deal with public sector 
labor disputes. A mediator of disputes in the public employment 
field, for example, must be prepared to deal with inexperienced par-
ties11111 and with employees who may be more militant,156 and more 
concerned with political and social issues than are their private sector 
counterparts.157 Similarly, fact finders and arbitrators, in order to 
deal adequately with a labor dispute in the public sector may need 
special skills in addition to those required in the private sector. At 
present, most fact finders tend to be either mediators, in which case 
they may not apply the necessary quasi-judicial approach,158 or arbi-
trators, whose experience tends to be in private employment griev-
ance arbitration.159 Neither experience necessarily prepares one to 
weigh the considerations present in public employment. 
Moreover, dispatch in the fact-finding and arbitration proce-
dures is essential in the public sector. While delay is irritating in 
private grievance situations, it can be calamitous in public employ-
ment, in which the avoidance of strikes assumes overriding impor-
tance. Independent arbitrators and fact finders do tend to be more 
prompt when they are functioning in critical public employee labor 
disputes than they do in private sector disputes.160 But that prompt-
ness could be more certain if the aids are provided by an adequately 
staffed state agency, aware of the need for promptness. 
Another consideration supporting the establishment of a state 
agency to administer the procedures which aid bargaining is the 
need for some degree of consistency in decisions. When outside 
parties are chosen by the bargainers, the individual biases of those 
155. Howlett, Michigan's New Public Employee Relations Act, 45 MICH. ST. B.J. 
14, 16 (1966). · 
156. There is some indication that public employees tend to be more militant 
than members of long-established private industry unions. That militancy is illus-
trated by the frequent rejections of negotiated settlements by rank-and-file public 
employees. See Kheel, supra note 144, at 934. 
157. Public employee disputes often involve noneconomic issues. For instance, in 
the Ocean Hill-Brownsville dispute, and in the Memphis Sanitation strike, elements 
of social conflict predominated. For an indication of the connection between public 
employee unionism and the civil rights movement, see 17th Convention of American 
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, GERR No. 248, B-3, B-4 to 6 
aune 10, 1968). 
158. See Statement by William Saxton at the 22d Annual Meeting of National 
Academy of Arbitrators, GERR No. 283 at B-1, B-3 (Feb. 10, 1969). 
159. Cf. Coulson, Labor Arbitration-The Insecure Profession, in PROC. OF N.Y.U. 
20rH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 131 (1967). 
160. Cf. Coulson, Spring Checkup on Labor Arbitration Procedure, 16 LAB. L.J. 
259, 260-61 (1965). 
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parties tend to produce diverse decisions.161 Such diversity is par-
ticularly harmful in public employment where a settlement in one 
dispute may affect both other employees of the governmental unit 
involved162 and employees of other governmental units.163 In view 
of the possible external effects of a single settlement, then, it is 
desirable for the state to seek some consistency in its fact-finding 
and arbitration decisions. That consistency can be gained, to some 
extent, by the setting of criteria for decisions164 but greater con-
sistency is obtainable if the fact-finding and arbitration are done by 
a single group. The consistent body of precedent produced in this 
manner will enable parties to determine ahead of time the probable 
outcome of resorting to outside aid, and, as a result, more disputes 
could be settled without invoking such aid. 
B. The Use of Sanctions To Encourage Bargaining 
In order to achieve consistent results from the application by a 
state agency of aids to bargaining, it may be necessary to provide 
certain sanctions to support those aids. Moreover, in a compre-
hensive approach, the punitive remedies of the strike prohibition 
may play an additional wle, since use of preventive aids, by itself, 
may fail to achieve an adequate balance of bargaining power. Sue-
161. Arbitration services provide extensive records on individual arbitrators, and 
on the basis of those records, parties seek the arbitrators most likely to furnish a 
favorable decision. Reliance on such past records is so extensive that a young arbitra• 
tor finds it almost impossible to break into the field. Coulson, supra note 159, at 133. 
162. The limitation on the amount of public funds available to satisfy employee 
wage demands in a given year means that a disproportionate increase won by a single 
group of employees will result in fewer funds for other employee groups. The dif• 
ficulties in this regard are aggravated by the political characteristics of public employ-
ment. Indeed, to the extent that the fundamental political impulse to maximize one's 
share of societal wealth is reflected in public employee attitudes, any settlement which 
threatens to reduce a particular group's share will be most strenuously resisted. Thus, 
a disproportionately large settlement for any particular group can both unfairly de-
prive other groups and lead to greater intransigence on the part of those groups. The 
problem is further aggravated by the multiplicity of bargaining units with which a local 
government must deal. See Rock, The Appropriate Unit Question in the Public Service: 
The Problem of Proliferation, 67 MICH. L. REv. 1001 (1969); Slavney, The Public Em-
ployee-How Shall He Be Represented?, GERR No. 269, at E-1 (Nov. 4, 1968). 
163. An employee group's settlement with one public employer tends to set the 
pace for bargaining by its counterparts in neighboring communities. This is partic-
ularly true in the case of school teachers, for in that area the central bargaining issue 
is often the comparison with surrounding school districts. Thus, in the recent strike 
by school teachers in Plymouth, Michigan, the major question was not whether to 
compare salaries with other communities, but rather with which communities salaries 
should be compared. Meeting of Plymouth Community School Board, Sept. 8, 
1969. There is a rational basis for treating the issue in this way: particularly in 
suburban areas in which school districts proliferate within a small geographical area, 
employers are relatively fungible, and a district's failure to meet the standard of its 
neighbors may result in the loss of its teachers. 
164. The setting of criteria is done by statute in Maine, :Minnesota, and Rhode 
Island. See note 140 supra and accompanying text. 
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cess in negotiations often depends upon a mutual desire to avoid a 
costly strike,165 and in the public sector, the relative cost of a strike 
to the parties involved is sometimes highly unequal. For example, 
a strike by public school teachers which merely delays the fall open-
ing of school represents little or no cost to the teachers, since state 
laws require a minimum number of school days per year and ac-
cordingly teachers will usually receive a full year's salary despite 
the delayed school opening. When the slight cost to teachers is 
compared with the record of substantial pay increases won by such 
delays, the tactic appears quite attractive indeed.166 That situation 
is in direct contrast to the one which arises in most private sector 
strikes, in which strike time represents a direct economic loss to 
the striking employees. When, as is often the case in the public 
sector, a strike presents little or no threat of economic loss to em-
ployees, it may be desirable to increase the cost of striking and 
thereby to encourage settlement. Indeed, in order to achieve an 
equitable balance of bargaining power, some means of cost-equaliza-
tion is essential. 
A possible cost-equalization approach is to allow damage suits 
by the employer against the union.167 Such an approach, however, 
far from promoting a balance of bargaining between the parties, 
would probably only aggravate any existing imbalance. In situa-
tions in which the union possesses the preponderance of power, the 
employer would be unlikely to invoke the damage remedy for fear 
of exacerbating relations; and when the employer holds the power, 
the availability of such a further remedy would merely increase his 
advantage. 
Another means by which cost-equalization might be achieved is 
through fines against individual strikers. But that approach seems 
to reflect older attitudes inconsistent ·with the new bargaining 
laws, and direct fines could appear to striking employees to be arbi-
trary and punitive and consequently could prompt greater in-
transigence in response. Moreover, it is questionable whether sanc-
tions against individuals contribute to a balancing of bargaining 
power between the parties. But even if such sanctions can promote 
a balance of power, they should be applied only to the extent neces-
sary to offset an excessive union advantage. Such an approach is 
165. Kheel Report, supra note 38, at 30. 
166. In September 1967, for example, the Detroit Federation of Teachers en-
gaged in a thirteen-day strike. The settlement then reached provided for a shorter 
school year, smaller class size, and a two-year contract for teachers with an increase 
in base pay from $5,800 to $7,500. GERR No. 210, at B-1 (Sept. 18, 1967). 
167. The employer is probably the only party who could sue, because a member of 
the general public injured by a strike of vital public services has no standing to sue 
the union. Jamur Prods. Corp. v. Quill, 54 CCH Lab. Cas. ,r 51,525 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1966) (decided under Condon-Wadlin Law). 
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consistent with the goals of strike prevention and equitable settle-
ments. Where individual penalties are presently required, however, 
their application is across-the-board and bears no rational relation-
ship to the power of the union, or to the equities of the situation.168 
Although a more discriminating application of individual pen-
alties might contribute more to equalizing the costs of failure to 
reach a negotiated settlement, it is clear that that goal can be better 
achieved by a flexible application of penalties against the union 
organization as a whole. One such approach is to assess fines against 
the union for each day that its workers are on strike.169 A related 
device, and one which is potentially very effective, is the suspension 
of the union's privilege of dues check-off.170 
168. See, e.g., N.Y. Crv. SERV. LAw § 210 (McKinney Supp. 1968), as amended, ch. 
24, § 8, [1969] N.Y. Laws 42 (McKinney Supp. April IO, 1969). 
169. That device has been less than fully successful in solving New York City's 
extended labor crises. See, e.g., Montana, supra note 38; Kheel, supra note 38. Part 
of the reason for its failure is the militant reaction it engenders on the part of unions. 
For example, the fine of $220,000 levied against the New York United Federation of 
Teachers-amounting to only a few cents per teacher per strike day-has been con-
demned by George Meany, who has expressed the AFL-CIO's sympathy by instituting 
a fund-raising campaign so the UFT will not have to "bear the burden alone." GERR 
No. 283, at B-8 (Feb. IO, 1969). The recent interest of established big labor for the 
plight of the public employee may be a product of statistics showing the contrast 
between the stagnant membership roles of private labor organizations as compared 
to the burgeoning membership of public employee unions. See Note, supra note 68, at 
549; Donoian, The AFGE and the AFSCME: Labor's Hope for the Future?, 18 LAn. 
L.J. 727 (1967). 
Another reason for the failure of the device of using fines might be its inability to 
achieve an adequate equalization because of statutory limitations on fines. Prior to the 
amendment in 1969, the Taylor Law's limitations on fines against unions that violated 
injunctions meant that a large union could, in effect, purchase the right to strike by 
paying fines amounting to perhaps twenty-five cents per member per strike day. GERR 
No. 283, at B-5 (Feb. IO, 1969). The recent amendment removed the limitations on fines, 
and the fine is now to be fixed at the discretion of the court. N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW 
§ 751(2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1969). 
If the fines are to be productive toward the goal of balancing bargaining power, 
the amount of any such fine should reflect, among other considerations, the ability 
of the union to pay. Neither a heavy fine against a small union nor an insignificant 
fine against a large union can effectuate that goal. The enforcement provisions of the 
New York law include as a relevant factor in assessing fines the union's ability to 
pay. N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 751(2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1969). 
170. The effectiveness of a loss of dues check-off privileges has been discounted 
by David Seldon, President of American Federation of Teachers. According to him, 
the penalty of loss of check-off would mean perhaps a 15% reduction in dues col-
lections, but "[w)e can always raise dues if we have to." GERR No. 282, at AA-6 
(Feb. 3, 1969). Recent New York experience seems to indicate the contrary. Fol-
lowing the teachers' strikes during the decentralization disputes, the UFT's dues 
check-off privilege was suspended, and the PERB stated that it would not reinstate 
check-off until the union gave a no-strike pledge. Surprisingly, the militant union 
president, Albert Shanker, has given that pledge. The suspension reportedly cost the 
union some one million dollars in lost dues. GERR No. 313, at B-19 (Sept. 8, 1969). The 
effectiveness of loss of check-off was also indicated when a New York court, after a 
strike, assessed an $80,000 fine and a suspension of check-off privileges against sanita-
tionmen. Union spokesmen were said to view the check-off loss as the more onerous 
penalty, because the union's monthly dues intake of $1,080,000 would then depend upon 
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There are other punitive sanctions possible, such as the loss of 
representation and punishment of leaders, but they are likely to be 
self-defeating. Loss of representation can be of no use in balancing 
the bargaining power except perhaps as a threat; the use of that 
extreme remedy does not contribute to a balancing, but simply 
removes one of the bargainers. Moreover, such loss of representation 
would hardly remove the strike threat, since a substantial number 
of strikes are concerned with the very issue of representation.171 
Similarly, punishment of union leaders is likely to have only a neg-
ative effect. Since its application comes after an impasse-strike situa-
tion has occurred, the punishment will very probably harden the 
union's resistance. In addition, the opportunity for martyrdom 
afforded to a militant leader may serve to intensify the dispute.172 
On the whole, punitive and enforcement measures may have 
some value as a means of balancing relative bargaining power in 
situations in which a strike would be less costly to the union than 
to the governmental employer. When punitive measures are ap-
plied in such instances, they can probably help to shorten a strike 
and possibly to deter future strikes.173 But if punitive measures are 
indiscriminately applied, without regard to their effects on the bar-
gaining process, the ultimate result will almost certainly be to 
worsen labor relations by increasing the unions' militancy. Still 
worse, an undiscriminating application will probably aggravate any 
existing imbalance of power, since the measures will have their 
greatest effect on the already weak unions and will leave the power-
ful unions substantially unaffected.174 
voluntary contributions from each employee. GERR No. 232, at B-9 (Feb. 19, 1968). 
Even if Seldon's view is accurate, however, the penalty can still perform its function 
in balancing bargaining power. A strike will, in any event, be more costly to the union 
because of the loss of check-off; and thus potential gains from the strike are more 
likely to be discounted in advance. 
171. But if the only penalty is loss of the right to be the exclusive bargaining 
representative, rather than loss of the right to represent at all, the effect may be some-
what less detrimental to labor relations. The employees would retain bargaining rights, 
but representation would be nonexclusive. Such an arrangement generally produces 
weak unions and might result in an excessive advantage for the employer. On the 
other hand, the result might be an increase in militancy as competing groups vie con-
tinuously for the employee's support. 
172. The likelihood of that result was demonstrated by the New York City experi-
ence. Montana, supra note 38, at 275-78. The problem has continued under the Taylor 
Law. See Kheel, supra note 38, at 8-12. The practice of imprisoning union officials is 
deplored by almost all commentators including the Taylor Committee which advo-
cated harsher penalties. Taylor Comm. Recommendations, Jan. 23, 1969, GERR No. 
283, at G-1, G-6 (Feb. 10, 1969). But the committee views the question as one for 
the judiciary to decide in evaluating its contempt process. Id. at G-6. 
173. But see note 169 supra. 
174. In the application of New York's former Condon-Wadlin Law, for example, 
its penalties were invoked only five times prior to 1965, and then only against upstate 
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C. Role of the Injunction in the Comprehensive Approach 
A potentially more flexible approach to problems of balancing 
bargaining power is offered by the court injunction. Although the 
injunction has traditionally been just another weapon for a power-
ful public employer, it could, if it were applied selectively, reinforce 
the bargaining goals of a comprehensive scheme of labor relations 
in the public sector. For example, an injunction could be made 
mandatory for strikes which occur before the parties have complied 
with certain required steps in the bargaining process.175 Courts 
could be required to determine, before issuing an injunction, that 
an employer has "clean hands" and otherwise satisfies the traditional 
criteria for equitable relief.176 The judicial proceeding could be 
further integrated with the bargaining aids by requiring the court 
to consider a fact finder's report in disposing of the request for in-
junction. If the availability of injunctive relief were dependent 
upon such standards, both parties would be encouraged to comply 
in good faith with statutory bargaining procedures. 
In some situations, however, there are inherent limitations upon 
the utility of the injunctive remedy to complement a comprehensive 
bargaining scheme. For instance, if the government, engaged in a 
unions which generally lack political power. Moreover, in New York City the Law 
was deliberately not invoked thirteen times, and was partially applied twice. Hilde• 
brand, supra note 14, at 140. It seems doubtful that a punitive measure by itself 
could ever be fully effective against a powerful union. Indeed, to make punitive mea• 
sures more effective, perhaps criminal penalties are required. In this connection, 
federal law provides that a striking governmental employee may be guilty of a felony 
and may receive up to a year's imprisonment and a $1,000 fine. 5 U.S.C. §§ 118p(3), 
118r (1964). Yet even so severe a penalty might be of limited effectiveness, especially 
in light of increasing union militancy; the federal law did not prevent the postal 
unions from repealing their traditional renunciation of the right to strike. GERR No. 
258, at A·l (Aug. 19, 1968). Nor did it prevent the air traffic controllers from engaging 
in a "sick out." GERR No. 302, at A-9 (June 23, 1969). Moreover, as the severity of 
the sanction increases, the likelihood of its enforcement decreases, since no govern-
mental employer even remotely concerned with political survival is likely to brand 
a striker as a felon. 
175. Michigan Report, supra note 84, at 16. 
176. Id. The court in School Dist. v. Holland Educ. Assn., 380 Mich. 314, 327, 157 
N.W .2d 206, 211 (1968), suggests this criterion for weighing injunctive relief. 
However, the approach was rejected outright by the New Jersey Supreme Court in 
Board of Educ. of Union Beach v. New Jersey Educ. Assn., 53 N.J. 29, 43, 247 A.2d 
867, 875 (1968). In that case the court held that lack of "clean hands" was no bar 
to injunctive relief when public welfare might be harmed. There are other difficulties, 
too, with the suggested approach. A court determination of whether a plaintiff has 
bargained in good faith might tend to infringe upon the determination of an unfair 
practice by the body initially responsible for that determination-in Michigan, the 
State Labor Mediation Board. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 423.215 (1967). Yet, a court's 
determination of this issue at the time of a requested injunction may be necessary if 
the good faith requirement is to have any balancing effect. Indeed, because unfair 
labor practice proceedings are notoriously slow, a prompt judicial determination may 
be crucial if the injunctive remedy is to have a positive influence on the bargaining 
process. 
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dispute with police or firemen, does not comply with its statu-
tory duty to bargain in good faith, injunctive relief should the-
oretically not be available to it, since the availability of such relief 
is to encourage the employer to bargain in good faith. But because 
of the nature of the occupation involved, a strike would be wholly 
unacceptable, and a court would have to grant an injunction despite 
the employer's lack of good faith in bargaining. Recognition of 
such limitations on the use of injunctions, however, does not mili-
tate against the selective application of that remedy. Instead, it 
implies that there should be special provisions, such as compulsory 
arbitration, for critical occupations. 
D. Administration of a Comprehensive Program of 
Bargaining Aids and Controls 
Since application both of sanctions and of aids to collective bar-
gaining should be aimed at the dual goals of equitable settlements 
and the prevention of strikes through an approximate balancing of 
bargaining power, it is of utmost importance that there be ad-
ministrative machinery capable of effective and consistent pursuit 
of those goals. Previous portions of this Comment have suggested 
that the scheme of bargaining aids and controls should be ad-
ministered by a state regulatory agency perhaps similar to New 
York's PERB.177 Because of the need for a comprehensive and con-
sistent approach, that agency should also have primary responsi-
bility for implementation of enforcement sanctions. It should be 
empowered to assess fines for strike activities and to suspend check-
off privileges.178 The criteria for assessing penalties should be 
enumerated in the statute creating the agency and should be con-
sistent with the aim of promoting an equitable balance. Thus, the 
statute could require that the amount of a fine or the duration of a 
suspension be increased if the union had not bargained in good 
faith, had gone on strike prior to exhausting supplementary pro-
cedures, or had engaged in an unfair labor practice. Similarly, it 
could provide that penalties for strike activity be lessened if the 
employer had failed to bargain in good faith or had otherwise been 
guilty of unfair labor practices. In assessing penalties, the regula-
tory agency should also consider the report of the fact finder con-
177. N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAW § 205 (McKinney Supp. 1968). See note 88 supra and ac• 
companying text. 
178. The Taylor Law presently gives the PERB power to suspend check-off [N.Y. 
CIV. SERV. I.Aw § 210(3)(f) (McKinney Supp. 1968), as amended, ch. 24, § 8, [1969) 
N.Y. Laws 44 (McKinney Supp. April IO, 1969)], but fines may be levied only by a 
court, and then only for violation of an antistrike injunction [N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAw 
§ 212(2}(a) (McKinney Supp. 1965), as amended, ch. 24, § 12, [1969] N.Y. Laws 47 
(McKinney Supp. April IO, 1969)], not for the strike itself. 
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cerning abuses of good faith by each party, and it should take into 
account the size of the union and its ability to pay.179 
The determination of penalties should be made in an ad-
ministrative proceeding, with judicial review limited either to 
enforcement of the agency's order or to appellate consideration of 
whether the agency had abused its discretion. The suggested ap-
proach would offer the advantage of developing a specialized body 
of administrative decisions to apply to future disputes and to serve 
as guidelines for the parties to those disputes. If, for example, the 
parties know that under certain circumstances, penalties definitely 
will be imposed or a particular remedy will or will not be available, 
they can act to their best advantage. Assuming that the proposed 
scheme is successful in its design and application, that course of 
action would be to bargain in good faith and, it is hoped, to settle. 
Another benefit of having a state agency responsible for ad-
ministration is that the agency would relieve the courts of the 
burden of imposing sanctions for strikes. Excessive reliance on 
judicial enforcement appears to be at least partially responsible for 
the Taylor Law's lack of success in New York.180 Under that law, 
the courts are enmeshed in the strike dispute from the beginning. 
When a strike occurs, the local government is required to seek an 
injunction181 and the court is required to grant it.182 Fines are im-
posed for violation of the court order, not for the strike per se.183 
Since any continued strike activity is categorized as an affront to 
judicial authority, the courts, not surprisingly, find it necessary to 
apply contempt powers, with the result that union leaders are sent 
to jail.184 Such incarceration is almost universally deplored as 
counter-productive,185 but that result must be expected if the con-
tempt process is relied on to effectuate strike prevention. 
By withdrawing the imposition of fines from the contempt func-
tion of the courts, a state would free the judiciary to exercise its au-
thority in a more appropriate manner, namely, in granting injunc-
179. The Taylor Law currently requires courts to take such factors into account in 
determining fines against the union. N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 751(2)(a) (Supp. 1969), as 
amended, ch. 24, § 12, [1969] N.Y. Laws 47 (McKinney Supp. April IO, 1969). 
180. The manner in which an injunction is required continues under the Taylor 
Law unchanged from that under Condon-Wadlin, and it was that feature of the old 
law which was at least partly responsible for its demise. See Montana, supra note 38, 
K.heel, supra note 38. 
181. N.Y. Crv. SERv. LAw § 211 (McKinney Supp. 1968). 
182. N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 751 (McKinney Supp. 1969). 
183. N.Y. Crv. SERV. LAW § 212(2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1968), as amended, ch. 24, 
§ 12, [1969) N.Y. Laws 47 (McKinney Supp. April 10, 1969). 
184. See K.heel Report, supra note 38, at 9. 
185. Id. See also Taylor Comm. Recommendations, Jan. 23, 1969, GERR No. 
283, at G•l (Feb. 10, 1969). 
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tive relief in emergency situations and in enforcing orders of the 
agency. Moreover, if injunctive relief is predicated upon traditional 
equitable criteria, and if the imposition of strike fines is divorced 
from the contempt process, respect for the judicial process should 
be enhanced. 
If the imposition of sanctions is thus bifurcated, it will become 
necessary to ensure that disposition by the courts is consistent with 
the rest of the scheme for labor relations in the public sector. The 
aims of the law could be impaired, for example, if a court were to 
grant an injunction without due regard to the equities of the situa-
tion. Conversely, a court's refusal to issue an injunction in a critical 
situation could harm the public and could coerce a public employer 
to accept a settlement that is heavily weighted against him. Hence, 
an important consideration is determining which court should have 
jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief. Since local courts are apt to 
be more familiar with the complexities of the situation than are 
distant or specialized courts, those local courts appear to provide the 
more appropriate forum.186 Considerations of convenience and 
flexibility support local court jurisdiction.187 On the other hand, 
when one of the parties has undue leverage because of its local 
political muscle, that power may influence a local court, at least in 
a state where judges are elected locally. But that consideration 
should not be crucial in determining which court should have juris-
diction, because, despite the frequent political pressures in public 
sector labor relations, those pressures are likely to have no sub-
stantial effect on any court.188 Indeed, such pressures are far less 
likely to affect courts than they are to affect other governmental 
bodies.189 In any event, the possibility that political pressures might 
186. See Michigan Report, supra note 84, at 15. 
187. The flexibility of disposition possible in a local court was recently illustrated 
in an action brought against striking teachers by the Board of Education in Plymouth, 
Michigan. Plymouth Community School Dist. v. Adas, No. 4381 (Mich. Cir. Ct. for 
Washtenaw County, filed Sept. 18, 1969). The Plymouth Board of Education presented 
a prima fade case of "irreparable harm" by alleging that a consequence of contin-
uing the strike would be the loss of state aid. But since the Board had sued the in-
dividual teachers rather than their organization, the court may have felt that granting 
the relief requested would have gone counter to traditional judicial reluctance to 
grant specific performance in situations involving personal services employment. The 
court evaded the dilemma by, in effect, ordering the parties to settle. After two days 
of enforced bargaining in chambers, the parties reached agreement, and the strike was 
terminated. It is doubtful that an equally desirable result could have been obtained 
under a more distant and perhaps more specialized and inflexible court. 
188. When a judge is elected, for example, his term of office tends to be quite 
long, thereby reducing the probability of adverse political consequences from any 
single decision. Moreover, he may have a large enough constituency to be able to 
avoid identification with the local government or with a single group of public em-
ployees. See note 189 infra. 
189. Not only does a judge have a longer term, but his constituency may differ 
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influence the decision of a local court can be minimized by the 
statutory provision of standards to govern the issuance of an in-
junction. A court's failure to consider the fact finder's report, for 
example, could furnish grounds for appellate reversal. By thus cir-
cumscribing the discretion of the local court, the statute can help 
to ensure that the issuance of injunctions will not impair the goal of 
effective bargaining. The statute might further require that the 
court make written findings in support of its decision. Such a re-
quirement would be an aid in supervising local courts and in 
encouraging their compliance with statutory standards. 
Although the courts must aid in the administration of a com-
prehensive approach to bargaining in the public sector, the public 
agency probably plays an even more crucial role, and consequently 
the nature of control over that agency is of fundamental importance. 
Should the agency be independent or should it be subject to polit-
ical control? On the one hand, independent regulatory agencies 
are ·widely believed to be subject to capture by those whom they 
regulate.190 But on the other hand, if the body were subject to 
direct political control, it might become controlled by a partisan 
political group. 
The possibility that an independent body would be captured by 
interested parties seems unlikely in the field of public employment. 
As some have argued, the capture of regulatory agencies is usually 
made with the approval of the political authority,191 and such ap-
proval would probably not be given in the public sector, since capture 
by employee interests would be in opposition to the political au-
thority and capture by the political authority or the government 
itself would immediately destroy the credibility and effectiveness of 
the entire scheme. Moreover, even if capture can be a significant 
danger, it is less likely to occur in an agency which regulates more 
than one interest. Finally, if the members of a public employment 
relations board are properly chosen, neither management nor labor 
should have a monopoly on representation. 
The extent to which there should be political control of the 
agency is a difficult question in light of the inherent political as-
significantly from that of a governmental executive. For instance, a judge may be 
elected from a county constituency rather than from a single municipality. As a result, 
a judge is not as likely as is a member of the government to be identified with the 
public employer, nor is he as likely to be vulnerable to the pressures of a single em• 
ployee group. 
190. See, e.g., M. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 
155 (1955). See also K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LA.w TREATISE § 1.03 (1958), and citations 
therein. 
191. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LA.w TREATISE § 1.03 (1958); Jaffe, The Effective 
Limits of the Administrative Process, 67 HARV. L. REv. 1105-35 (1954). 
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pects of public employment.192 Dangers of control by local govern-
ments or their employees can be minimized if establishment of the 
agency is on the state level. The problem of political control of the 
agency at that level by outstate interests unfriendly to labor does 
not seem to be a realistic possibility, because a state that is able to 
enact a public employee bargaining law in the first place is prob-
ably not so thoroughly controlled by antilabor interests that the 
agency would fall under their power. Finally, the danger that the 
state government might establish an agency simply to serve its own 
interests should be mitigated by the realization that such an agency, 
without apparent independence and objectivity, would be useless. 
It thus appears that neither the threat of domination by special 
interests nor political control would present a substantial danger to 
the impartiality of a regulatory agency. Other considerations, how-
ever, militate in favor of a degree of independence. One of the 
purposes of resorting to a state regulatory body is consistency of 
administration, and that objective might be frustrated if the agency 
were subject to extensive personnel changes following each elec-
tion. Moreover, the appearance of being divorced from politics 
would greatly enhance the bargaining parties' respect for the 
agency's decisions. Such independence could be achieved by the 
device of relatively long and staggered terms for members and by 
the imposition of statutory limitations on the representation of a 
single political party.19s 
Despite the many benefits of a comprehensive plan for public 
sector labor relations, however, there are inherent limitations upon 
what can be accomplished under that type of plan. A bargaining 
scheme is basically a method for institutionalizing dispute resolu-
tion, and the nature of public employment ensures that some dis-
putes simply will not be susceptible to such resolution. It is difficult 
to imagine, for example, that the New York City school decentraliza-
tion dispute could have been settled through an established compre-
hensive plan. Moreover, to the extent that bargaining itself is con-
fined by limitations on state governmental powers and finances, 
political recourse will inevitably be necessary when those limits are 
reached.1114 Disputes with such great political dimensions probably 
can be resolved only by an ad hoc legislative disposition; and for 
that reason, it seems futile to attempt to deal with them in a general 
bargaining scheme whose goal should be to establish procedures by 
which ordinary public sector labor disputes can be resolved. 
192. See text following note 68 supra. 
193. The New York PERB is structured in this manner. N.Y. Crv. SERv. LAw 
§ 205(1) (McKinney Supp. 1968). 
194. See notes 121, 143 supra and accompanying text. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Attempts to achieve reasonable and equitable settlements of 
employment disputes in the public sector continue to be plagued 
by two conflicting approaches to the problem of strike prevention. 
One seeks this goal through outright prohibition, while the other 
strives to avoid strikes by promoting collective bargaining on the 
private sector model. Neither approach by itself is satisfactory, exist-
ing combinations of the two provide little help, for they seemingly 
attempt to apply each approach without regard for the effects of the 
other. It seems likely that if the seemingly irreconcilable goals of 
strike prohibition and equitable collective bargaining are to be 
achieved, it will be through a planned blending of the two ap-
proaches. But the combination must aim toward neither the tradi-
tional punitive concept of strike prohibition nor adoption of the 
private sector analogy for bargaining. Instead, the aim should be to 
apply a variety of methods selectively with a view toward effectuating 
an approximate balance of the bargaining power. The Michigan Su-
preme Court in Holland has moved in that direction by making the 
issuance of injunctive relief dependent upon equitable considera-
tions and by attempting to encourage resolution of disputes at the 
bargaining stage.195 Nevertheless, courts are limited in this regard; 
and the effectiveness of such decisions is hampered by the absence 
of adequate legislation to regulate and encourage collective bar-
gaining. 
The desired balance of bargaining power can be promoted with 
a variety of techniques. But the effectiveness of each depends upon 
the circumstances in which it operates and upon the other techniques 
with which it is combined. If bargaining power is to be effectively 
balanced, there must be integration of techniques toward a common 
goal, rather than the present bifurcation in which bargaining aids 
such as mediation and fact-finding are applied in an attempt to 
emulate labor relations of the private sector, while, at the same time, 
fines and penalties are used indiscriminately for punishment. Un-
doubtedly, no single approach will be satisfactory for all states, 
since the factors influencing bargaining power vary so widely. But 
if the diverse goals of strike prevention, effective collective bargain-
ing, and equitable settlements are to be attained in the public sec-
tor, where the militancy of employees is ever-increasing, continued 
efforts to develop a workable approach are imperative. 
195. 380 Mich. 314, 327, 157 N.W.2d 206, 211 (1968). 
